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RUTGERS LAW REVIEW 
VOLUME 34 Winter 1982 NUMBER 2 
A UNIFYING THEORY FOR THE JUST-COMPENSATION 
CASES: TAKINGS, REGULATION AND PUBLIC USE 
John A. Humbach* 
The fifth amendment to the Constitution provides, in simple for- 
mulation: 
nor shall private property be taken for public use, without  just compensa- 
ti0n.l  
Reconciling this plain language with the government's2 general 
power to regulate has been a vexing complication of just-compensa- 
tion law. The activities which may be restricted under the so-called 
police power3 include the use and enjoyment of property, personal 
and real.4 The complication arises because restrictions on the uses of 
* Professor, Pace University School of Law. B.A., Miami University (Ohio), 1963; J.D., 
Ohio State University College of Law, 1966. 
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The requirement applies to the states through U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980); Chicago, B. & Q. 
Ry. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236 (1897). Comparable requirements are, by express language or 
interpretation, a part of all state constitutions. See 3 P. NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN 5 8.1[2] (3d 
. - 
ed. 1980). . 
2. This Article refers to the "government" typically without specifying which level of 
government (federal, state or subdivisions of the latter) is meant. This usage avoids cluttering the 
exposition with the obvious but, for present purposes, irrelevant distinctions resulting from 
federalism. Where the distinction is relevant, it will be specified; otherwise, the references to 
government apply mutatis mutandis to the level(s) of government obviously appropriate from 
the context. 
3. See Berman v. Parker. 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
The definition [of the police power] is essentially the product of legislative determi- 
nations addressed to the purposes of government. . . . 
Public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and order-these are 
some of the more conspicuous examples of the traditional application of the police 
power. . . . Yet they merely illustrate the scope of the power and do not delimit it. 
Id. at 32 (1954); see also infra note 124. 
Federal regulations generally are traced to constitutionally "enumerated powers (e.g., to 
regulate interstate commerce); however, as the distinction between "enumerated and "police" 
powers has little bearing on the present discussion (see United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 
339 U.S. 799, 808 (1950)), it will be ignored. Cf. infra note 24 relative to the federal power to 
regulate navigation. 
4. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (personal property); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. 
New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (real property); Coldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 
590 (1962) (real property). Substantive due process limitations related to the scope of the police 
power are discussed at text accompanying notes 127-34 infra. 
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land5 can hurt the owner's economic position as much as an outright 
taking in fee.6 Yet, by and large, such police power regulations do 
not constitute compensable "takings" under the just-compensation 
clause, nor, in general, are such regulations constitutionally infirm 
merely for their impact on the value of affected landsa7 
It has frequently been observed that, from a fairness standpoint, the 
present state of the law is somewhat i l logi~al .~  The Supreme Court 
concedes that it has "no set formula," much less a readily applicable 
test, for determining when a land-use regulation becomes a taking of 
private p r ~ p e r t y . ~  Despite its obvious practical importance, "[tlhe 
principle upon which the cases can be rationalized is yet to be discov- 
ered. . . ."lo Rather, the law of police-power takings is a widely 
acknowledged hodgepodge, its doctrines a farrago of fumblings which 
have suffered too long from a surfeit of deficient theories." 
5. The discussion that follows applies with much the same force to personal property as to 
real property. The primary focus of inquiry, however, will be land and police-power regulations 
restricting the uses of land. Accordingly, the kind of property contemplated will be real prop- 
erty. 
6. E . g . ,  Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 517-19, 370 
P.2d 342, 344, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638, 640 (1962), appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962) (regulation 
deprived land of all economic use); see also Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 
365,384 (1926) (75% loss); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405 (1915) (over 90% loss); 1 
R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING 2d 5 3.25 (1976); cf. Andrus v .  Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 
(1979) (personal property). 
7. See supra note 6. See generally Annot., 52 L. Ed. 2d 863 (1978). The presumption of 
constitutionality (e .g . ,  Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594, 596 (1962)) makes a 
successful attack on use regulations a generally unlikely prospect. 
8. E.g., Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme 
Court Expropriation Law, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 63 ("a crazy-quilt pattern"); Sax, Takings and the 
Police Power, 74 YALE L . J .  36, 37 (1964) ("a welter of confusing and apparently incompatible 
results"); Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by  Police Power: The Search for Inverse Condem- 
nation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1971) ("the decisional law is largely characterized by 
confusing and incompatible results, often explained in conclusionary [sic] terminology, circular 
reasoning, and empty rhetoric"). 
9 .  See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); accord Andrus 
v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962). 
10. Sax, supra note 8, at 37. In a 1981 article it was reported that "legal scholars are still in 
search of a formula or set of rules which will lend precision to [the decision] process." Wright, 
Exclusionay Land Use Controls and the Taking Issue, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 545,575 (1981). 
Sax himself proposed a theory, based upon a putative distinction between acts of government 
as an "enterprise" (compensable) and actions it takes as an "arbiter" of private conflicts (non- 
compensable). Sax, supra note 8, at 61-67. The distinction made by his theory, however, was not 
always easy to discern. The theory does not account for all the important lines of cases, id.  at 70, 
and Sax in any event later felt compelled to "disown" it. See Sax, Takings, Private Property and 
Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J .  149, 150 n.5 (1971). 
11. 
Attempts have been made to reconcile apparent inconsistencies by classifying cases 
according to such factors as the regulation's purpose or its burdensome consequences, 
the relationship between the public interest asserted and the private detriment 
suffered, and the evil to be cured by the regulation. . . . But these efforts have not 
provided a means by which judicial action can be predicted. Clearly, if the utility of 
legal rules in a jurisprudential system can be judged by their predictability, the rules 
employed to determine where regulation of land use ends and taking of property 
begins are useless. 
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The past inability to find a unifying theory for the police-power 
takings cases seems to be a result of a persistent failure to refine 
properly the concepts involved. It is argued herein that the operative 
distinction made by the cases can be adequately described in terms of 
two suitably defined conceptions which may be inferred from the 
holdings themselves. By use of these two differentiated conceptions, 
which together cover a major portion of what are generally under- 
stood as property interests, it is possible not merely to reconcile the 
police-power takings cases with one another, but also to develop a 
theory unifying those cases with the general law of eminent domain. 
The discussion begins with some remarks concerning the concept of 
property as a general matter. It will then consider briefly an approach 
to the problem which, though promising and advanced, nevertheless 
falls short of achieving an internally consistent, unifying theory. Fol- 
lowing this introduction, an attempt will be made to specify the two 
distinctive conceptual components of property interests on whose dif- 
ference the cases seem to turn, and then to demonstrate the suitability 
of this conceptual distinction as the foundation for a coherent theory 
of the law. 
Although the meaning accorded to the word property is critically 
related to the scope and import of the just-compensation clause, no 
definitive conception of the property idea seems possible. The bound- 
aries of the concept in ordinary usage are too vague and unspecifiable 
to be analytically useful in fixing the limits of the just-compensation 
requirement. Precise conceptual boundaries can be defined, but they 
would be inherently artificial, often unconvincing, and infected by 
any weaknesses in the philosophico moral axioms on which they are 
based.12 Neither an ideal nor an ordinary usage definition of prop- 
erty will be attempted here.13 Nevertheless, in order to clarify the use 
of the term in this Article, a few remarks about the meaning or 
conception of property are in order. 
Donaldson, Regulation of Conduct in Relation to Land-The Need to Purge Natural Law 
Constraintsfrom the Fourteenth Amendment, 16 W M .  & MARY L. REV. 187, 194 11.48 (1974). 
See Sax, supra note 8 ,  at 46. 
12. A highly regarded attempt along these lines is Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fair- 
ness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of ''lust Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L .  REV. 
1165 (1967); see akio Sax, supra note 10. For a general as well as favorable discussion of this 
mode of proceeding, see B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977). For the 
author's views see Book Review, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 793 (1978). 
13. The necessity to define property will be avaided by looking instead at two usual (and 
perhaps necessary) conceptual components of property which happen to receive opposite treat- 
ments in the outcomes, if not the rationales, of just-compensation cases. See infra text accompa- 
nying notes 47-76. 
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First, in standard usage, the word property refers not merely to the 
things which are subjects of ownership but to the legally recognized 
and protected ownership interest as well.14 In this Article the word 
"property" will refer to this latter conceptual construct-the owner- 
ship rather than the things owned.15 
Second, property interests include not merely present possessory 
estates, but also (without attempting to be exhaustive) future inter- 
ests, incorporeal interests, powers of disposition, and liens. Certain 
incorporeal interests-negative easements and like servitudes-will 
draw our particular attention because of their similarity to land-use 
regulations.le There has been some question whether certain kinds of 
servitudes, such as real covenants and equitable servitudes,, are truly 
interests in land or even property. l7 This issue seems, however, to be 
largely one of how inclusively one defines property. On the theory 
that like interests should be classified alike, such servitudes will be 
regarded as real property, i.e., as a variety of easements, without 
addressing the semantic question of whether that term ought to be 
applied to them. It is their legal characteristics for our purposes, not 
their taxonomy, which are important. l8 
The question incidentally arises as to the extent to which just-com- 
pensation cases can shed light on the "true" nature of property or the 
proper meaning of that term. One writer has suggested, for example, 
14. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945). 
15. The term is not used in the "vulgar and untechnical sense of the physical thing with 
respect to which the citizen exercises rights recognized by law . . . [but refers to] the group of 
rights inhering in the citizen's relation to the physical thing, as the right to possess, use and 
dispose of it." Id. 
This "modern sophisticated" idea of property has made obsolete an earlier view that the 
just-compensation clause required payments only for physical intrusions. Van Alstyne, supra 
note 8, at 2 n.5; see also Callender v. Marsh, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 418 (1823); Monongahela 
Navigation Co. v. Coons, 6 Watts & Serg. (Pa.) 101 (1843); Stoebuck, Condemnation of Rights 
the Condemnee Holds in Lands of Another, 56 IOWA L.  REV. 293, 295-97 (1970). There are, 
however, still anachronistic lines of authority. See infra notes 109, 111, 112 and 114 and 
accompanying text. 
Exact boundaries of the ownership concept will not, of course, be defined. See supra text 
accompanying note 13. Rather, the references will be to the relatively more indubitable core of 
meaning. 
16. See infro text accompanying notes 30-41 and 115-19. Negative easements is used herein 
to refer generally to all non-possessory interests in land entitling the holder to certain stipulated 
forbearances on the servient land. Real covenants (contractual promises touching and concern- 
ing land and running with it), and equitable servitudes (promises binding upon purchasers with 
notice or for no value), are thus included in the collective concept of negative easements. 
17. Seesupra note 16; 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 5 5  9.1, 9.8, 9.12, 9.24 (A. Casner ed. 
1952); Stoebuck, supra note 15, at 303-06. Compare Sprague v. Kimball, 213 Mass. 380, 100 
N.E. 622 (1913) with Moses v. Hazen, 69 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1934). 
18. For just-compensation purposes, it should make no difference whether these interests are 
considered property or mere contract rights; takings of both are compensable under the Consti- 
tution. See Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502, 508-09 (1923). 
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that the eminent domain cases provide "a fascinating laboratory in 
which to explore the concept of 'property.' " l9 This appears unlikely. 
The Constitution contains rnany words, e.g., commerce, speech, due 
process, equal protection, yet one would hardly look to constitutional 
cases to see what those words mean-except in their constitutional 
context. 
At the other extreme, statements are occasionally found to the effect 
that private rights or technical title under state law, i.e., property as 
between the owner and non-governmental others, is not necessarily 
property within the meaning of the just-compensation clause.20 Ar- 
chetypical, perhaps, is Justice Jackson's dictum, in relation to certain 
riparian rights: "[Olnly those economic advantages are 'rights' which 
have the law back of them. . . . We cannot start the process of 
[just-compensation] decision by calling such a [riparian] claim as we 
have here a 'property right'; whether it is a property right is really the 
question to be a n s ~ e r e d . " ~ ~  
If taken broadly to imply that the federal definition of property for 
purposes of just compensation may deviate freely from various state 
law conceptions of the term, such statements are unacceptable. If the 
just-compensation clause means anything, it means that the federal 
and state governments are on much the same footing as private per- 
sons with respect to the acquisition or destruction of rights that states 
enforce in respect to things. It is hard to imagine that the framers of 
the just-compensation clause thought otherwise. To be sure, the con- 
stitutional meaning of the word property would not have to be de- 
fined in terms of the substantive law, generally state law, that gives 
force to the legal interests usually comprehended by property.22 But 
if the correspondence is not close,23 the just-compensation clause be- 
19. Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings, and Due Process, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1057, 1072 
(1980). 
20. E . g . ,  Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141, 163 (1900) ("a bare technical title"), c~troted 
with approval in Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176-77 (1979); United States v. 
Commodore Park, 324 U.S. 386, 390 (1945). 
21. United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502-03 (1945). Justice Jackson's 
line of thought has been viewed as echoing Jeremy Bentham's idea that property depends 
entirely on the law for its existence. See injra note 70; Dunham, supra note 8, at 80. There is a 
great difference though. Bentham was making a positivist jurisprudential observation about the 
origin of the thing-related legal rights that the courts are supposed to enforce. Jackson's state- 
ment, as ratio decidendi, sounds more like a declaration of judicial sovereignty over principle. 
22. United States ex rel. TVA v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 279 (1943) ("the meaning of 
'property' . . . in the Fifth Amendment is a federal question"), quoted in United States v. 
Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266 (1946); see also PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 
93-94 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
23. In fact the federal definition of property "will normally obtain its content by reference to 
local law." United States ex rel. TVA v. Powelson, 319 U.S. at 279. For "as a general proposition 
. . . the United States, as opposed to the several States, [is not] possessed of residual authority 
that enables it to define 'property' in the first instance." PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 
447 U.S. 74, 84 (1980). See also Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (use of 
Hawaii state and native law); Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960) (taking of liens 
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comes, in practice, a kind of never-never land anomaly, detached 
from the texture and policy of the rest of the law.24 
Despite the Supreme Court's admission of defeat,25 the search to 
find a unifying theory for the extant cases continues. In a recent 
created under state law held compensable); General Box Co. v. United States, 351 U.S. 159, 
165-67 (1956) (area invaded was subject to the state's "ancient" servitude under state law; held, 
no compensation); Fox River Paper Co. v. Railroad Comm., 274 U.S. 651, 657 (1927) ("no 
protection to supposed rights of property which the state courts determine to be non-existent"). 
In the recent case of Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980), the 
Supreme Court applied a federal definition of property instead of the state's where the federal 
definition was more inclusive (and, hence, more protective) than the state's definition, saying: "a 
state by ipse dixit, may not transform private property into public property without compensa- 
tion." See infra text accompanying notes 211-15. The Supreme Court found its authority for its 
more inclusive definition of private property in general principles. Of course, the thrust of the 
text is that the federal definition of property cannot be significantly narrower than the applica- 
ble state's definition. It must, however, in some instances be broader if the just-compensation 
clause is to apply to the states, which it does. See supra note 1. 
For an interesting discussion of the limits of government authority to redefine property, see 
concurring opinion of Justice Marshall in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 
93-94 (1980). See also infra text accompanying notes 185-221. 
24. Statements such as Jackson's quoted in the text accompanying note 21 supra can, of 
course, simply be written off as more wrong thinking in a hodgepodge field of law. However, 
such statements are actually not so extreme when read in the context where they are made, i.e., 
in reference to the subordination of all private riparian rights in navigable waters to the federally 
entrusted paramount public right of navigation over such waters. E.g., United States v. Twin 
City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 224-25 (1956); United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power 
Co., 229 U.S. 53, 65-66 (1913). But cf. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) 
(compensation required if navigation easement is extended to previously "fast" lands). 
If all that Jackson meant was that property rights as between private persons are not control- 
ling when such private rights conflict with the paramount public easement for navigation, such 
statements make perfect, if tautological, sense. Private riparian rights in navigable streams and 
waters are, by definition, a subordinate residuum subtending the public navigation easement. 
United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502-03 (1945). Any losses due to changes 
in such a navigable stream can be said to result "not from a taking of the riparian owner's 
property . . . but from the lawful exercise of a power to which that property has always been 
subject." United States v. Chicago, M.,  St. P. & P. R.R., 312 U.S. 592, 597 (1941). Accord 
United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 123 (1967). 
Of course, this argument can be carried too far. Without the just-compensation clause, on the 
one hand, all private property might be simply regarded as a subordinate residuum subtending 
the public's public-use easement (an idea inherent in the very words "eminent domain"). See P. 
NICHOLS, supra note 1, $8 1.12-.13. On the other hand, if the just-compensation clause or due 
process clause prevents such a subordinated status for property generally, why should the 
treatment of riparian rights in navigable streams be an exception? Perhaps the answer lies in 
(1) the long history of public navigation rights as a qualification on private rights, going back to 
the Roman law of jus publicum, later held by the King on behalf of his subjects (see for further 
discussion, Humbach & Gale, Tidal Title and the Boundaries of the Bay, 4 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
91, 94-100 (1975)), and (2) the specific treatment given "navigation" in the commerce clause. 
U.S. CONST. arts. I & VIII. In any case, the public navigation easement is special, and 
statements made in reference to it are not necessarily applicable in other contexts. 
By contrast, the public avigation easement seems to be receiving narrower treatment. Not only 
are subjacent landowners' rights defined according to state law, see United States v. Causby, 328 
U.S. 256 (1946), but compensation is allowed for regular overflights within the avigation zone. 
Id.; see also Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962) and discussion at note 93 infra. 
25. See supra text accompanying note 9. 
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article,26 Professor Stoebuck pointed critically to "the general lack of 
connection between police-power takings and the larger subject of 
eminent domain"" and offered an innovative suggestion for rap- 
prochement: 
Special study should be made of some fact patterns that are closest to those 
in which land use regulations may cause takings . . . [viz.] that large 
group of takings known as "non-trespassory takings," such non-physical 
invasions of private property as deprivations of street access and condem- 
nations by nuisance.28 
Compared with actual physical appropriation, takings of this latter 
"non-trespassory" sort are factually closer to cases of land-use restric- 
tions imposed under the police power. Therefore, Stoebuck reasoned, 
they should offer greater insight as to the essential differences between 
non-compensable regulations and compensable regulatory takings.2e 
Professor Stoebuck cited three types of situations in which non-tres- 
passory acts of government are held to require just compensation, 
either because the acts impair an affirmative easement or because they 
constitute "inverse c~ndemna t ion"~~  of a negative ea~ement .~ '  From 
such cases, he concludes that the constitutional concept of taking 
refers in its essence to circumstances of " t r a n ~ f e r , " ~ ~  a kind of compul- 
sory transfer to the government of the same sorts of property interests 
(estates, easements, real covenants) which are commonly transferred 
voluntarily. He argues that this transfer-oriented test of taking is 
supported by "all cases of trespassory [i.e. physical] or non-trespassory 
takings with the exception of police power takings. . . . ,, 33 
26. Stoebuck, supra note 19. 
27. Id. at 1081. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. See United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253 (1980). 
[A] landowner's action to recover just compensation for a taking by physical intru- 
sion [on the part of the government] has come to be referred to as "inverse" or 
"reverse" condemnation. . . . The phrase "inverse condemnation" appears to be one 
that was coined simply as a shorthand description of the manner in which a land- 
owner recovers just compensation for a taking of his property when condemnation 
proceedings have not been instituted. . . . A condemnation proceeding, by contrast, 
typically involves an action by the condemnor to effect a taking and acquire title. 
Id. at 255-57. 
31. The three types of cases cited were: 
(a) deprivations of street access enjoyed by abutting owners, comparable to a release of an 
easement, 
(b) extinguishment of a restrictive covenant burdening government-owned land in favor of 
private land, again comparable to a release of an easement (here a i~egative easement), and 
(c) inverse condemnation of a nuisance easement, as in airport overflight cases, which is 
comparable to a grant of an easement. Stoebuck, supra note 19, at 1084-86. 
32. Id. at 1087-89. 
33. Id. at 1091. Professor Stoebuck does not contend that conipulsory transfer is the sole 
element of a taking. Additionally, there must be "some activity by an entity having the power of 
eminent domain," and the effect "must diminish a landowner's property rights," including the 
"rights of use and enjoyment." Id. It is obvious, however, that the element of transfer is the key 
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Unfortunately, Stoebuck's transfer-oriented test of taking does not 
work well when applied to the police-power regulations cases, the 
object of his exercise. Specifically, although the adoption of land-use 
regulations seemingly effects a compulsory transfer to the government 
of what amounts to a negative easement or servitude over the regu- 
lated lands,34 much like those which are commonly transferred volun- 
t a r i l ~ , ~ ~  the land-use regulations which occasion such transfers are 
almost never regarded as takings. 
In order to avoid this incongruity between his transfer-oriented 
theory and the law, Stoebuck argues that negative easements can be 
regarded as transferred "to the government" only if the land-use 
regulations in question specially benefit governmentally-owned 
land.3e Thus, in the usual regulation case, the transfers are not really 
to the government but rather to other private owners whom the 
regulations benefit.37 Without such a transfer to the government, 
Stoebuck seems to conclude, the government's regulation is not com- 
pensable eminent domain. 
The weak point in Stoebuck's argument, however, is its assumption 
that, absent a government-owned dominant tenement, regulatory 
transfers must not be to the government but instead to other private 
owners. In terms of enforceable legal interests, the facts do not sup- 
port his theory. It is not other owners who acquire the discretion and 
power to enforce the regulations by legal action, or to release the 
restrictions back to the owners of the servient land. It is the govern- 
ment alone which assumes that position and which, therefore, is the 
transferee of the "negative  easement^."^^ Lacking a dominant tene- 
ment of its own, what the government gets is essentially a negative 
easement in gross.40 
differentiating factor since these other two elements are concomitants of virtually any govern- 
mental act likely to come into controversy under the just-compensation clause. 
34. See supra note 16. 
35. See Stoebuck, supra note 19, at 1091-92. 
36. Id. at 1092-93. 
37. Id. at 1092. 
38. See id. at 1088-89, 1092. Thus, Stoebuck proffers the following test for a police-power 
taking: "A police power regulation on land use is an eminent domain taking only when its effect 
is specially directed toward benefitting a governmei~tal entity in the use of land in which that 
entity holds incidents of ownership." Id. at 1093 (emphasis added). 
39. Stoebuck in effect switched gears when he looked to who received the benefits of 
regulations in order to determine who received the legal interest under them. A theory based on 
transfer of legal interests should consider just that, modifications of legal relationships and 
positions, not the incidental or intended economic effects which the transfers may have. It does 
not detract from the government's legal position obtained by means of regulations that it may 
gain no economic advantage from them. Indeed, it often does not gain economically. But cf. Sari 
Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 656 (1981) ("Because police power regula- 
tions must be substantially related to [a public purpose] . . ., it is axiomatic that the public 
receives a benefit while the offending regulation is in effect.") (Brennan, J.,  dissenting). 
40. Like servitudes in gross generally, private negative easements in gross are not favored in 
the law, but they are nevertheless recognized proprietary interests. E.g.,  Merrionette Manor 
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In sum, Stoebuck's distinction between valid regulations and regu- 
latory takings, on further analysis, hinges not on whether there is a 
transfer to the government. It turns rather on whether the property 
interest transferred to the government is a negative easement in gross 
as distinguished from an appurtenant negative easement, an affirma- 
tive easement, a fee simple, or some other recognized type of prop- 
erty. His transfer-oriented test of taking, however, does not account 
for this distinction, and thus it cannot, alone, supply a basis for 
differentiating non-compensable regulations from police-power tak- 
ings. 
Moreover, there is another, though perhaps lesser, problem with 
Professor Stoebuck's dominant-tenement criterion for treating certain 
land-use regulations as takings and not others. In principle, there is no 
apparent reason why the government always should be disqualified 
from enjoying the benefits of legitimate police-power zoning, even 
where the government happens, in a given locale, to be the primary or 
even sole beneficiary of the zoning  regulation^.^' 
In summary, the lesson which Professor Stoebuck draws from the 
other eminent domain cases, involving trespassory and non-trespas- 
sory takings, appears to be a sound one: the common strain of those 
cases is that takings are typically characterized by compulsory trans- 
fers to the government of commonly recognized varieties of property 
interests. To differentiate police-power takings from non-compensa- 
ble regulations, however, a distinction must be made which, unhap- 
pily, the transfer theory of taking does not address. 
Land has value because the use of land has value. Any event which 
impairs the usefulness or potential of a piece of land will, almost 
certainly, impair its value as well. This relationship between useful- 
Homes Improvement Ass'n v. Heda, 11 Ill. App. 2d 186, 136 N.E.2d 556 (1956); Pratte v. 
Balatsos, 99 N.H. 430, 113 A.2d 492 (1955); Neponsit Property Owners' Ass'n v. Emigrant 
Indus. Sav. Bank, 278 N.Y. 248, 15 N.E.2d 793 (1938); 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, SIlJ7TO 
note 17, 4 9.32. Moreover, when held by a homeowners' association, for example, they operate 
and serve almost exactly the same way as their public land-use planning counterparts (e.g., 
zoning, environmental regulations, architectural controls). "[Tlhe general good of all within the 
community requires adherence to some common standards. Everybody's business is no one's 
business. Hence, the enforcement of such standards had to be centralized and home owners 
associations came into being." Merrionette Manor Homes Improvement Ass'n v. I-Ieda, 11 Ill. 
App. 2d 186, 189, 136 N.E.2d 556, 558 (1956). 
41. One practical concern may be the ineluctable conflict of interest faced by a governmen- 
tal body which is considering, e.g., restrictive zoning to enhance the value of its own rcal estate. 
The height limitations on buildings in Washington, D.C., which allegedly preserve the grandeur 
of government edifices, may be the nation's most prominent example. D.C. CODE 5 5-405. 
Interestingly, Congress withheld the authority to increase permissible building heights as one of 
a few exceptions when it conferred home rule status on the District of Columbia. D.C. CODE 
9 1-147. See Larrabee v. Bell, 10 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1926). 
Heinonline - -  34 Rutgers L. Rev. 251 1981-1982 
RUTGERS LAW REVIEW 
ness and value makes it appear that there is a fundamental inconsist- 
ency in the law of just compensation. The law purports to relieve 
completely against the value losses resulting from certain governmen- 
tal acts, such as physical intrusions and  interference^,^^ and not at all 
with respect to others, most particularly, regulations on use.43 Yet all 
of this is supposed to be consistent with "fairness and justice."44 
From an economic perspective, it seems inexplicable that the Con- 
stitution should require the compensation of losses resulting from 
impairments of physical possession, but not of comparable losses of 
value resulting from restrictions on use. On the one hand, it is the 
owner's economic interest in land-his interest in its value-which is 
the primary interest compensated by payments of just compensa- 
t i ~ n . ~ ~  On the other hand, if outcomes are any guide to purpose, it is 
clearly not the economic interest which the law is directed to pro- 
t e ~ t . ~ ~  In any event, it does not appear possible to explain variations 
among case outcomes in terms of variant detrimental effects which 
different governmental acts have on owners' economic interests. The 
effect of governmental acts on the owner's economic interest in his 
land is simply too general a factor to differentiate cases of regulation 
from cases of taking: it is present-to the owner's detriment-in both. 
By contrast, even a superficial comparison of the typical non-po- 
lice-power takings cases (trespassory and non-trespassory) with land- 
use regulation cases reveals a striking difference between them in the 
kinds of legal property interests which are allegedly invaded. In tak- 
ings cases the property interests at stake always include legally action- 
able rights which the owner has in relation to others' behavior, chiefly 
42. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312,326 (1893) ("the compensa- 
tion must be a full and perfect equivalent for the property taken"); see also Kaiser Aetna v. 
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979); United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506 
(1979); United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373 (1943); Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 
16-18 (1933). The physical intrusions and interferences referred to are no longer limited to ouster 
or the appropriation of an affirmative easement. See supra note 15 and i t~fra text accompanying 
notes 111-13. 
43. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Goldblatt v. Town of 
Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); cf. Andrus v. Allard, 
444 U.S. 51 (1979) (regulations prohibiting sale of parts of protected hirds held not to be a taking 
under fifth amendment). 
44. Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978) (compensation not 
awarded); National Bd. of YMCA v. United States, 395 U.S. 85, 92 (1969) (compensation not 
awarded); Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (compensation awarded). 
45. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374-75 (1943). It is the owner's loss, not the taker's 
gain, that is the measure of the value of the property taken. Id. at 375. Market value is the 
normal measure. Id. at 374. See generally Annot., 60 L.  Ed. 2d 1107 (1980) and 19 L. Ed. 2d 
1361 (1968). 
46. "[Tlhe decisions . . . uniformly reject the proposition that diminution in property value, 
standing alone, can establish a 'taking'. . . ." Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 
U.S. 104, 131 (1978). See also cases cited supra note 6; Sax, supra note 8, at 51-53 ("if we look to 
what the Court has done, . . . the Court has not treated protection of values as its primary 
goal"). 
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rights to others' forbearance from such acts as trespasses, ousters, and 
nuisances.47 In cases of non-compensable regulation, the interest at 
stake is solely the owner's freedom to use and enjoy the land which he 
Both of these legal property interests, namely, the right to others' 
forbearance and the freedom to use and enjoy, are valuable; both are 
part of the owner's economic interest in his land. Nevertheless, the 
two represent different ideas which are conceptually distinguishable 
in several fundamental ways.4g The remainder of this Article will be 
concerned in considerable part with further exploring the conceptu- 
ally distinctive characteristics of the two interests and elaborating 
their differences. The difference which is key to this inquiry, how- 
ever, is a difference not in their characteristics but rather in their 
,k significances: a taking of property under the just-compensation clause 
is almost always found when government acts impair or destroy le- 
gally actionable rights;50 conversely, such a taking is almost never 
found where the government's acts merely affect the freedom to use 
and enjoy.51 That is, the distinction between rights as against others 
47. E.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979) ("the 'right to exclude' 
. . . [is one] that the Government cannot take without compensation. This is not a case in which 
the Government is exercising its regulatory power . . . [to] cause an insubstantial devaluation"). 
The demonstration and elaboration of the proposition in the text are the crux of this Article- 
and their statement here, unsupported for the moment, is only for purposes of introduction. See 
also injra text accompanying note 48. 
48. E.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592 (1962) ("the fact that [an 
ordinance] deprives the property of its most beneficial use does not render it unconstitutional"); 
see also Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), quoted infra text accompanying note 123. 
49. The analysis which follows is by no means the first to distinguish between legally 
enforceable rights and freedoms, nor are the comn~entators and judicial opinions in the just-com- 
pensation area the first to overlook it. Hobbes criticized Lord Coke for missing its significance 
(T. HOBBES, DIALOGUE BETWEEN A PHILOSOPIIER A N D  A STUDENT OF THE COMMON LAWS OF 
ENGLAND 73 (J. Cropsey ed. 1971)), and Bentham and Salmond, among others, made the 
distinction. See R. DIAS, JURISPRUDENCE 34-35 (4th ed. 1976). However, Hohfeld deserves credit 
for the first systematic specification of a comprehensive set of jural concepts, of which right and 
freedom are two. W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 35-50 (Cook ed. 1919) (also 
found at 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913)). Hohfeld used the word "privilege" to designate the concept 
which this author calls a freedom. However, the word "privilege" is too misleading, both as a 
matter of ordinary and legal usage as well as etymology, to be a suitable name for what is, 
essentially, a vestige of a pre-legal-intervention state of affairs. 
One important embellishment on Hohfeld's scheme is to include the government as one of the 
actors on the jural scene. Although the government's rights and duties are not the same as those 
of its subjects, there nevertheless is a possibility and routine practice of measuring the conformity 
of governmental acts to legal norms to which the government ostensibly submits. Sec. 'rn ' f ra notes 
54, 101, and 103. It is in this light that the government will be treated not merely as an arbiter 
but also as a jural actor, though one with special prerogatives. Further elaboration on this 
analytical account of the government's role as actor appears injra note 54. 
50. The exceptions fall into two categories. First are the remaining vestiges of the now 
largely abandoned physical intrusion criterion of taking. See supra note 15 and injra notes 109, 
111, 112, and 114. Second are the redistributive takings of rights for other than public use. See 
infra text accompanying notes 184-221. 
51. See infta text accompanying notes 125-56 where the exceptional cases are reconciled 
with the theory being presented. 
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and freedoms to use appears to fix the line between takings and 
regulation. 
Certainly, the rightslfreedoms dichotomy has not usually been the 
ostensible basis for any court's decision. Accordingly, the approach of 
this Article is rather like that of a chemist, observing phenomena 
which appear to have their own (perhaps unknowable) "natural" 
ontological logic, and afterwards positing a coherent explanatory 
structure for purposes of our own understanding. Unlike the chemist's 
result, however, the result here is probably less arbitrary than, say, a 
molecular theory superimposed on nature; for the ontology of a body 
of law is comprised not of material phenomena, but rather of judicial 
decisions which have been made in furtherance of policy goals. 
Though courts may not always consciously articulate the policy dis- 
tinctions underlying their decisions, it is likely that the analytical 
distinctions which can explain their decisions will closely parallel the 
unarticulated operative distinctions. 
IV. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 
The distinction between "rights" and "freedoms" is a distinction 
between two stipulatively defined concepts, each of which covers a 
significant, but quite different portion of what is generally understood 
as property interests. The words selected to designate those concepts 
are words taken from ordinary usage. It is solely to the concepts 
defined below, however, and not to any other meanings in ordinary 
usage, that the words "right" and "freedom" will refer in this Article. 
The property interest referred to as a right is defined as the legal 
advantage of having the physical or morals2 power of the government 
invocable by legal action in order to induce the compliance of others 
or to redress others' non-compliance with some particular set of be- 
havioral  requirement^.^^ In more mundane tones, the holder of a 
right is one who has a cause of action against those others who are 
52. The reference to moral power, in addition to physical power, accounts for legal actions 
which seek declaratory judgments or nominal damages. More broadly, the realistic threat of an 
adverse result in a legal action and the common desire to conform and behave in accordance 
with law are also part of the moral power of the government and, hence, of the legal advantage 
constituting a right. The potential cause of action, however, is the cornerstone of the conception 
of "right" as defined herein. 
53. The behavioral requirements are subject, of course, to contingencies and these contin- 
gencies comprise, in general, all of the operative facts of the cause of action other than the 
defendant's behavior itself. 
Incidentally, behavior requires a somewhat stretched definition where the rights in question 
relate to certain kinds of causes of action, e.g., breaches of contractual representations and 
warranties, breaches of promises as to the behavior of others, and claims of strict liability in tort 
or claims similarly founded on circumstances outside the control of defendants. As these possibil- 
ities appear to have little to do with the rights usually associated with property, they were 
disregarded in selecting the word "behavior" to describe defendants' connection with causes of 
action. 
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subject to specified behavioral requirements but who do not, or who 
sometimes threaten not to comply with them. The behavior-contin- 
gent cause of action is the cornerstone of a right as herein defined. The 
others who are subject to the behavioral requirements, and to enforce- 
ment by legal action, may be said to have a duty to comply with the 
particular behavioral requirements. Thus, for purposes of this discus- 
sion, the concept of duty is defined in terms of the concept of right. 
Upon reflection, it appears that absent special contractual arrange- 
ments, the only rights normally comprehended by property interests 
in land are rights to others' (including, in general, the  government'^^^) 
forbearance from certain kinds of acts. Most prominent is the posses- 
sory owner's right to others' forbearance from acts in derogation of his 
assertion of exclusive control over who has access to his land and the 
conditions of such access.55 This pa~ticula~ right to forbearance shall, 
54. The idea of a right against the government presents some problems. A right of property, 
as defined in the text, is primarily government support of one's freeclorn from others' uninvited 
interferences. (The word "freedom" is used here with its wider, ordinary meaning, not in the 
narrower sense defined in the text accompanying iirfra notes 59-75.) Of course, the government 
can use its power to prevent government interferences, but not in the same sense that it can use 
its power to prevent others' interferences. Thus, in a way, there can be no rights against the 
government in the same sense that there are rights as against others. 
The separation of powers and diffusion of authority and control among various government 
organs obfuscate this whole matter considerably-lending force, in effect, to the reality of rights 
against the government. For now, though, let us ignore these obfuscations and assume a 
monolithic state, both for brevity and in order to cast the argument for no-rights-against-the- 
government as strongly as possible. 
A response to such an argument might be as follows: Even given that there is no superior force 
to prevent uninvited interferences from the government, the government may nevertheless act as 
though it is subject to a duty to refrain from uninvited interferences-or to observe any other 
private rights-just as thouglt it were one of the persons whom it regulates. This is exactly the 
phenomenon which occurs when, and to the extent, the government waives sovereign immunity. 
See infra notes 94 and 101-03. The just-compensation clause is a further example of the govern- 
ment putting itself on somewhat the same footing as others. Id.; supra text accompanying notes 
21-24. 
The alleged theoretical difficulty in recognizing rights against the government is that the 
govern~ent ,  including its constitution-amending organs, cannot irrevocably commit itself, by 
self-regulation, to observe private rights. What if, for example, the federal and state govern- 
ments decided to ignore the just-compensation clause? Would it still be binding as a source of 
constitutional rights? A pragmatist might find such questions an academic bore. Quite apart 
from practical concerns, however, the absence of irrevocable binding force or commitment is 
also logically irrelevant to the question of rights against the government. 
Property rights, for example, whether against private others or the government (i.e., govern- 
ment support of freedom from uninvited interferences or government self-restraints from unin- 
vited interferences) are equally subject to the government's pleasure on the matter of their 
recognition and duration. Likewise subject to the government's pleasure, is the right, constitu- 
tional or otherwise, not to have such rights modified or withdrawn, e.g., by constitutional 
amendment. This practical fact of ultimate governmental autonomy does not, however, make 
just-compensation law, constitutional law, or law in general an unanchored matter of no 
import. The requirements of the law are still tied ineluctably to generally accepted underlying 
policy desiderata. The requirements will endure and have force as long as the desiderata remain 
acceptable. In the final analysis, however, the acceptability of these desiderata is the only claim 
to life which they have. 
55. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179 (1979) ("the 'right to exclude' 
[is] universally held to be a fundamental element of the property right"). The rights in question 
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for convenience but not limitation of meaning, be designated as the 
"right of exclusivity." It refers generally to the legal advantage of 
being able to invoke the government's power to retain or regain actual 
physical possession, e.g., by actions in ejectment, or to redress or 
enjoin unlicensed intrusions, e.g., by actions in trespass. 
Other property rights may arise in special situations, but they too 
are rights to others' forbearance. For example, the owner of an ease- 
ment has a right to the servient owner's and others' forbearance from 
unreasonable interferences with the use of the servitude.5e The 
owner of land benefited by a restrictive covenant has the right to 
forbearance from stipulated behavior on the part of the owners of the 
land burdened by the ~ovenant .~ '  The law of private nuisance con- 
fers a general right to others' forbearance from acts on their land 
which unreasonably and substantially interfere with the use and en- 
joyment of one's own land.5s Thus, to generalize, apart from special 
contractual arrangements, occasional equitable servitudes, or real 
covenants which impose affirmative burdens, the rights associated 
with property in land are largely concerned with others' negative 
behavior. The event which they contemplate is that uninvited others 
stay away. 
are never as absolute as the brief description in the text may imply. For example, the right to be 
free from invasions of others may be qualified by privileges, public and private. E . g . ,  Proctor v. 
Adams, 113 Mass. 376 (1873) ("it is a very ancient rule of common law, that an entry upon land 
to save goods . . . is not a trespass"); Ploof v. Putnam, 81 Vt. 471, 71 A. 188 (1908); see also 
Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16 (1879) (privilege to destroy buildings to prevent spread of fire); 
Harrison v. Wisdom, 7 Tenn. (7 Heisk.) 99 (1872) ("The right to destroy property in cases of 
extreme emergency . . . [is a] right existing at common law, founded on necessity. . . ."). A 
privilege receiving more recent recognition is the state-conferred privilege to freely express 
oneself and to petition in certain semi-public areas of private property. Pruneyard Shopping 
Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
Of course, as an original question, and apart from the text of the Constitution, there is no 
reason why one of the qualifications of the right cannot be that it is inapplicable against the 
government. See Case of the King's Prerogative in Saltpeter, 77 Eng. Rep. 1294 (1607), and 
supra note 24, concerning such subordinate status in relation to the federal navigation easement. 
It is, however, the broad import of the just-compensation clause to limit this privileged status of 
the government. Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546, 552-53 (1914). Under the 
just-compensation clause, the government is not on quite the same footing as private persons 
because it can force a sale, but it nevertheless must, like private persons, respect private property 
by at least paying compensation. Still, asserting that it is the broad import of the just-compensa- 
tion clause to impose limitations on the government does not answer or beg the question. The 
details of those limitations remain an issue, and are, indeed, precisely the issue. 
56. E.g.,  Orange and Rockland Utils., Inc. v. Philwood Estates, 52 N.Y.2d 253, 266-67, 418 
N.E.2d 1310, 1315-16, 437 N.Y.S.2d 291, 297 (1981); City of Pasadena v. California-Michigan 
Land and Water Co., 17 Cal. 2d 576, 110 P.2d 983 (1941); see Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 
444 U.S. 164, 180 (1979) ("[Tlhe government . . . may not, without . . . paying just compensa- 
tion, require [the owners] to allow free access to the dredged pond. . . .") (emphasis added). See 
generally 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 17, $ 5  8.14, 8.105-8.108. 
57. These interests may or may not be proprietary, a point not worth arguing about. See 
supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text. 
58. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS 88 826-831 (1939); 6A AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 
17, $5  28.25-28.28. 
Heinonline - -  34 Rutgers L. Rev. 256 1 9 8 1 - 1 9 8 2  
19821 JUST COMPENSATION 257 
The interest referred to as a freedom to use and enjoy is mostly 
concerned, by contrast, with the owner's own affirmative behavior. A 
freedom may be defined as the legal advantage which one has when, 
in reference to particular behavior, others cannot by legal action 
invoke the physical or moral power of the government in order to 
redress or induce the behavior on one's own part.59 Thus, a person 
has a freedom to engage in an activity if, or to the extent, the govern- 
ment has not made such activity civilly actionable at the instance of 
itself or others, or criminally actionable at the instance of the govern- 
ment itself. Phrased differently, a freedom in relation to an activity or 
its omission is the absence of a duty to observe another's rights. 
Freedom means not being subject to causes of action.60 
A freedom is conceptually quite different from a right. The freedom 
to act in a particular way does not mean that the government's power 
may be invoked to induce others' compliance or to redress their non- 
compliance with any particular behavioral requirements. No causes of 
action are available to realize the freedom to use and enjoy, and the 
government will not intervene to redress its disappointment. A free- 
dom is exercised by engaging in an act or an activity or omitting to act 
if the freedom is negative; a right is typically exercised by instituting a 
lawsuit. 
The most prominent of the freedoms associated with property inter- 
ests are the freedoms to use and enjoy, in either general or particular 
ways.e1 These freedoms of use and enjoyment can be seen as a part of 
the larger freedom to engage in any non-proscribed acts, activities, or 
omissions.62 The comparatively wide residual freedom of activities 
on one's own land, however, a locale as to which others generally 
have few rights, has the appearance of being rooted in the property 
interest itself. This appearance, though, is relative. The general duty 
to avoid activities on others' land,e3 and a limitation on the permis- 
59. Or, if the freedom is vis-a-vis only certain othcrs, those certain others cannot so invoke 
the state's power. 
60. Cj. supra text accompanying notes 52-54. 
61. The freedom to use and enjoy is by no means the only freedom associated with property. 
There is, for example, the freedom to refuse to make a transfer, i.e., exercise a power, except for 
a consideration. The government's elimination of this freedom of sale is also not compensable. 
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979). Susceptible to like analysis are cases such as Bowles v. 
Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944) (upholding rent and price controls). 
62. That is, any acts, activities or omissions which are not actionable by others, because 
others have no rights in relation thereto, i.e., which are not the subject of any duties. The 
question may be posed whether it is most accurate to view "every act as permitted unless legally 
prohibited or "every act as prohibited unless legally permitted." According to this author's 
intuition, the first version seems more likely to keep things in the proper historical order, 
whatever the relevance may be of that. However, this sort of inquiry being not very fruitful in 
the end, the first and more liberal version is simply assumed, that the government is the 
annihilator, not the well-spring of freedom. 
63. This is the correlative of their right of exclusivity. 
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sible activities on public or state-owned land,e4 simply leaves one's 
own land as the only locale where natural liberty remains relatively 
unimpaired .65 
The freedom to use and enjoy land is sometimes referred to as the 
right of use and enjoyment. Within the definition of right as used in 
this Article, however, there could be no such thing as a right of use 
and e n j ~ y m e n t . ~ ~  The only direct legal advantage which the law can 
confer in relation to one's own activities, such as use and enjoyment, is 
a freedom from successful legal actions by others, i.e., an immunity 
from judgments. Enforcing the right to others' forbearance from in- 
terfering with one's own activities does, of course, indirectly protect 
the freedom to engage in such activities. Yet such enforcement di- 
rectly protects only the right to forbearance and not, strictly speaking, 
the freedom, as those two are conceptually di~tinguished.~' By its 
nature, freedom cannot itself be violated or redressed. Rather, a 
freedom is a behavioral possibility with which the government will 
not interfere at all, neither to support nor to obstruct, except to 
enforce any associated rights.6s 
To summarize and further illuminate the distinction between the 
concepts which this Article designates as property rights and freedoms 
as they relate to land, the two may be compared point by point as 
follows: 
1 .  Rights are concerned solely with others' activities, primarily their for- 
bearance from interferences (broadly speaking) with the land, but con- 
ceivably also forbearance from other interferences (e.g., with the use of an 
easement) or from other acts (e.g., nuisances, violations of negative ease- 
ments). Such rights to forbearance may, as a practical matter, be the 
predicate of use and enjoyment, but they are not a legal guaranty thereof. 
Freedoms, by contrast, are concerned with the activities of the person 
having the freedom, not others' activities, and freedoms contemplate no 
necessary participation, cooperation or involvement of others for their 
exercise and, more importantly, guaranty none. 
64. In public areas owned by the government (e.g., streets), the limited permission or license 
idea might be better framed in terms of special regulations applicable to areas which are not 
owned privately or by the government in a proprietor-like capacity (e.g., the state capitol). The 
consequences of the distinction appear to be negligible. 
65. See infra text accompanying notes 71-75 for further elaboration. 
66. This statement is limited to the context of the rightslfreedoms dichotomy presented by 
this Article. Statements about rights to use and enjoy in the course of general usage are a 
semantically different matter. See infta text accompanying note 81. Of course, general usage 
may obscure important conceptual distinctions-precisely the reason for the careful differentia- 
tion of certain definitions in this Article. 
67. There may be a legal right to enjoy a particular freedom, i.e., it may be a specific tort 
for others to prevent exercise of the freedom. For example, the general freedom of movement is 
supported by the tort of false imprisonment. More commonly, though, it is the general personal 
and property torts which support the wide residuum of freedoms to engage generally in non-pro- 
scribed activities. The frequent presence of ad hoc or general rights which support the exercise of 
freedoms does not make the two the same thing. 
68. See supra note 67. 
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2. Rights impose, through correlative duties, mandatory behavioral re- 
quirements on others, which requirements are enforceable by legal actions 
for damages, sometimes for specific relief (injunction), and sometimes by 
the government's power to pUnish.88 
Freedoms, by contrast, carry no warrant  for government intervention in 
the event of disappointment in their exercise except indirectly where the 
violation of some right is causally responsible for the disappointment. The 
concept of "freedom," however, does imply immunity from judgment or 
lawful action-legal action or self-help-founded upon the disappoint- 
ments to  others which exercise of the freedom may entail. 
3. Rights are created by the government in the sense that the legal appa- 
ratus of the government is what  specifies the behavioral requirements to be 
imposed, identifies the claims to  be enforced, and provides the mechanism 
for legal e n f o r ~ e m e n t . ~ ~  
Freedoms, by contrast, seemingly pre-exist intervention by the govern- 
ment, and are not dependent upon the government for their exercise 
except insofar as a right to others' forbearance may be a practical predi- 
cate-for their exercise. 
4. Rights apply, respectively, only to specific areas of land and are advan- 
tageous to the holder only in relation to the specific areas to  which they 
apply. 
Freedoms, by contrast, apply more to the person than to specific areas of 
land; i.e., they benefit the holder wherever he may be, subject to location- 
contingent regulations applicable to particular places. Restrictions on the 
freedom to use and enjoy land are frequently location-contingenL7' Land- 
use regulations, however, are by no means always location-c~ntingent , '~ 
and restrictions of freedom that have little to do with land-use regulation 
frequently are  loca t ion-~on t ingen t .~~  Since land is immovable, location- 
69. Insofar as a criminal action to punish is treated as an enforcement of private property 
rights, the government's standing might be viewed properly as vicarious or derivative. The 
government has, of course, its own interest in faithful observance of its criminal laws. 
70. As Jeremy Bentham wrote, with apodictic aplomb: "Property and law are born together, 
and die together. Before laws were made, there was no property; take away laws and property 
ceases." J. BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION, PRJNCIPLES OF THE CIVIL CODE, pt. 1, 112 (E. 
Dumont ed. 1864). 
This dictum, which rather presupposes the non-legality of such supergovernmental institutions 
as international law and extra-governmental institutions as customary law, may or may not be 
regarded as true, depending largely on the definitions which one chooses to supply to the various 
words comprising it. Certainly, the sudden disappearance of organized government would 
probably not occasion the immediate or even eventual demise of the institution of property or the 
behavioral patterns associated with that institution. Nevertheless, legal property (which, by an 
almost undeniable process of mutual influence, is closely congruent with any possible institution 
of extra-legal property) could not exist without the familiar supportive legal apparatus. In any 
event, what the just-compensation clause may mean in a legal system which offers no other legal 
protection for property expectations is a question that is highly academic. 
71. E.g., environmental and historic preservation regulations, and zoning. 
72. For example, prohibitions on growing marijuana or producing alcoholic beverages 
(Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887)); mining gold (United States v. Central Eureka Mining 
Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958)); building unsafe houses and suffering unreasonable hazards to invitees, 
are all regulations upon freedom and, by extension, are non-location-contingent restrictions on 
land use. 
73. E.g., prohibition of abortions except in hospitals and authorized clinics; prohibition of 
nudity in areas open to public view; prohibitions on driving over 30 m.p.h. except outside of 
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contingent restrictions on activities may appear to be deductions from the 
ownership interest in land rather than deductions from the hypothetical 
pre-government natural liberty of those who are on it.74 By corollary, it 
may be said that the freedom to use and enjoy is derived from ownership. 
Nevertheless. it is at least as accurate to sav such freedoms exist. and 
perhaps persist, because they are not impaired as a result of others' owner- 
ship.75 
Of course, both rights and freedoms have economic value, and the 
holder is properly concerned with preserving both: the pinch can be as 
hard whether the goveinment impairs a freedom or takes a right. 
Nevertheless, for better or worse, the just-compensation clause has not 
been interpreted as a policy to protect economic values,76 but as a 
protection for only those values consisting of rights. 
The legal significance of the rightslfreedoms dichptomy becomes 
quite visible when one compares borderline cases such as the factually 
similar cases of United States v .  Pewee Coal Co. 77 and United States v .  
Central Eureka Mining C O . ~ ~  Both of these cases involved govern- 
ment intervention, as a wartime measure, into mining operations of 
private companies. In Pewee, to avert a nationwide strike, the United 
States took possession of most of the nation's coal mines, requiring 
mine officials to act as "agents" of the government, and otherwise 
exerted dominion and control. A compensable taking was held to 
result. In contrast, in Central Eureka, no compensable taking was 
found when the government merely prohibited the operation of gold 
mines in order to conserve equipment and manpower for the mining 
of more essential ores. In terms of the rightlfreedom analysis, the 
distinction is obvious: in Pewee, there was an elimination of rights by 
ouster from posses~ion ,~~ while in Central Eureka only freedoms to use 
were affected. These two cases demonstrate how the substantive dif- 
ference between rights and freedoms can be legally significant 
in distinguishing compensable takings from other, non-compensable 
cities and villages, and-quite importantly-prohibitions of any unlicensed activity on land 
belonging to others (as a result of their rights of exclusivity). 
74. On reflection, it is rather curious that land-use regulations have become so widely 
regarded as property rules, having to do with the dimensions of ownership rather than personal 
freedom. Regulations on the use of particular types of chattels are not similarly viewed. For 
example, the rules against assault with deadly weapons, though applicable to only certain kinds 
of chattels, such as guns and knives, are generally not regarded as having to do with the property 
or dimensions of ownership in such chattels. 
75. This includes the government's ownership of government-owned land. See supra note 
64. 
76. See supra text accompanying notes 42-46. Whether the policy is for better or worse, or, 
as Sax says, preposterous, supra note 8, at 48, see infra text accompanying notes 177-84. 
77. 341 U.S. 114 (1951). 
78. 357 U.S. 155 (1958). 
79. Possession is the traditional factual predicate of actions in trespass or nuisance. See infra 
note 96. 
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governmental actions that similarly affect economic values. The dis- 
tinction is not a mere formality barren of s u b s t a n ~ e . ~ ~  
It is perhaps important to make clear what the foregoing distinction 
between freedoms and rights does not mean to say. First, it does not 
mean to say that, as a matter of general usage, there is an error or 
impropriety in utilizing the word right to refer to the concept desig- 
nated earlier as a freedom. It is common to refer to a right to use and 
enjoy land, or to recognize that such right of use and enjoyment is part 
of the bundle of rights that comprise ownership or property.81 Such 
usage is simply too widespread and familiar to be wrong or improper, 
or to be extirpated even if it were. In any case, to further emphasize, 
the distinction that is important to this discussion is not between 
meanings of words. The essential distinction is between the stipu- 
latively defined concepts that have been designated rights and free- 
doms. It is this author's thesis that, distinguishing between these two 
defined subtypes of property interests carefully, there is not, and 
cannot be, a right to use and enjoy land, only a freedom to do so. 
Second, and more significantly, it has not been suggested, nor will 
it be, that the constitutional meaning of property in the just-compen- 
sation clause can properly refer only to rights and not freedoms, as 
those terms are used in this Article or otherwise. The bundle of legal 
interests comprising ownership or property obviously can be seen to 
include freedoms as well as rights, not to mention a number of other 
interests which, according to the usage of H ~ h f e l d , ~ ~  may be denomi- 
nated as powers, immunities, disabilities, liabilities, and no-rights. 
There is no reason a priori why the just-compensation definition of 
property should include one, or some, but not all of these interests. 
However, the holdings of Supreme Court cases point unambiguously 
to the conclusion that the just-compensation clause meaning of prop- 
erty does not include freedoms, at least not the freedoms of use and 
enjoyment. Unlike rights, these freedoms apparently may be taken or 
destroyed without payment of compensation. Indeed, it turns out that 
a very good definition of police-power regulation is simply a govern- 
mental act which effects such a taking or destruction of freedoms 
alone. 
80. This was alleged by Sax, supra note 8, at 47-48. Sax's assertion that Central Eureka 
represents an application of the now obsolete "physical intrusion" requirement for a taking, see 
supra note 15, is similarly beside the mark. The case is perfectly consistent with cases holding 
that, absent physical invasion, a compensable taking of rights can occur. See infra note 114 and 
accompanying text. 
81. E . g . ,  United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373,377-78 (1945); seesupra note 
15; B .  ACKERMAN, supra note 12, at 27; Stoebuck, supra note 19, at 1091. 
82. See supra note 49. 
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V. APPLYING THE RIGHTIFREEDOM ANALYSIS 
The value of a legal test depends upon several factors including ease 
of application, conformity to the existing body of both germane and 
analogous cases, and suggestiveness of plausible policy underpinnings 
for the distinctions which it makes. A test of constitutional taking 
based upon the rightslfreedoms dichotomy is at least as easy to apply 
as the "fairness and justice" factors which are its "no set formula" 
 precursor^.^^ To show its conformity with the existing body of law, 
its predictions will be compared with the results of a number of 
representative holdings, primarily recent Supreme Court decisions.s4 
Following this comparison, attention will be given to possible policy 
underpinnings of just-compensation law which are suggested by a test 
employing the rightslfreedoms dichotomy. 
A. Physical Intrusion Cases 
Appropriating possessions5 of privately held land, or making physi- 
cal use of it as though under an affirmative easement,s6 both consti- 
tute compensable takings of private property. In these situations, 
there is a limitation or elimination-in effect, a transfer to the govern- 
ment-of both the owner's rights of exclusivity and his freedom to use 
and enjoy. Taking possessory title eliminates both, and taking an 
affirmative easement limits both by subjecting the rights to an excep- 
tion, for the government, and the freedoms to a qualification-for- 
bearing from unreasonably interfering with the government's freedom 
to use.87 The distinction between rights and freedoms does not play a 
visible role in these cases of physical appropriation or use since, under 
their facts, the property interests which are taken include both rights 
and freedoms. The rightslfreedoms dichotomy is not, however, incon- 
sistent with such cases. 
It  is important to note that, in order for a physical intrusion to 
constitute a compensable taking, the physical intrusion must take a 
right away-that is, the effect of the intrusion must be to deprive the 
83. See supra text accompanying notes 9 and 44. It has often been repeated that these 
determinations can only be decided case-by-case. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 
U.S. 104, 124 (1978). This, of course, is no test at all. 
84. The comparison is between the predictions and holdings, or hypothetical holdings men- 
tioned in dicta. The rightlfreedom dichotomy does not play a prominent role in the stated 
rationales in such cases, though this is hardly to be expected in light of the wandering past of just- 
compensation theory. 
85. E.g., United States v .  Great Falls Mfg. Co., 112 U.S. 645 (1884); accord United States v.  
Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943) (railroad tracks); United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903) 
(permanent flooding). 
86. E.g.,  Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); Criggs v. Allegheny County, 
369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); see additional cases infra note 
1 M1. -
87. See supra note 56. 
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owner of factual predicates, e.g., possession, for one or more causes of 
action which he might otherwise have had, either immediately or 
subsequently. When the government merely violates a right,ss or 
indirectly defeats its e n f o r ~ e r n e n t , ~ ~  but does not take the right away, 
no taking occurs, even though the effect on use and enjoyment may be 
disastrous. 
Under the rightlfreedom analysis the explanation for these no-tak- 
ings cases is that acts in derogation of rights are not necessary depriva- 
tions of rights. That is, even though an act of the government might, 
if committed by others, be actionable as a tort,g0 it will not necessarily 
constitute a taking. To be a taking, there must be an act which is 
tortiousel and which has the further legal effect of depriving an owner 
of the prior-existing factual predicates for one or more potential causes 
of action.e2 Only then would the owner be deprived of rights.93 
88. Cornpare National Bd. of YMCA v .  United States, 395 U.S. 85 (1969) (temporary 
intrusion by U.S. troops not compensable) with United States v .  Gencral Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 
373 (1945) (taking of leasehold is compensablc). See get~erolly Sanguinctti v. United States, 264 
U.S. 146 (1924); Keokuk & Hamilton Bridge Co. v .  United States, 260 U.S. 125 (1922). 
89. E.g., Mullen Benevolent Co. v. United States, 290 U.S. 89 (1933); Omnia Commercial 
Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502 (1923) (requisition of steel \vhich \\,as contractually commit- 
ted to plaintiff, frustrating plaintiffs contract rights); see ir?fro notc 90. 
90. E.g., trespass or nuisance. Note, however, that government acts in this category arc not 
necessarily tortious in character. For examplc, in Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 
U.S. 502 (1923), when the government requisitioned steel contractually committed to plaintiff, 
the effect was to totally frustrate its contract rights. However, acts of a private person that result 
in comparable frustration of a contract might not be an actionable tort. See Robins Dry Dock & 
Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927); \V. l '~ossw, HANDBOOK F T I I E  LAW OFTORTS 8 129, at 
938-42 (4th ed. 1971). 
91. The reason why there must be a tortious act by the government or one acting under 
government auspices is examined ir?fra note 93. 
92. For example, ouster from possession deprives thc owner of the prior-cxisting factual 
predicates of standing to maintain a trespass or nuisance action. See discussion it~Jru notes 95-96 
and accompanying text. 
93. Remember that the cause of action is the cornerstone of the right concept, as hcrein 
defined. See supra text accompanying notes 53-54. 
Apparently, the mere elimination of bases for inchoate causes of action is not enough to invoke 
the just-compensation requirement. See United States \I. Sponenbarger, 308 U.S. 256, 267-68 
(1939). There must also be conduct which occasions such actions, e.g., an entry into possession or 
a use of somebody's land by goverment or under its auspices. In the first place, the mere 
elimination of bases for legal action without conduct occasioning such action, e.g., thc mere 
declaration by Congress of avigation easements, would not likely result in any loss to the owners 
and, hence, the just amount of compensation would be zero. Cj. Duke Power Co. v .  Carolina 
Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 94 11.39 (1978) (no compensation for new legal limitation 
of liability for nuclear accidents). 
There is more to the matter, however. Consider, for example, a congressional declaration that 
there is an easement for avigation within bounds prescribed by Federal Aviation Administration 
regulations, 49 U.S.C. $ 5  1301(29), 1304 (1976 & Supp. 111 1979). The declaration in itself 
would not seem to be a basis for compensating anyone. As to high-level aviation, nothing would 
be taken ("Cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum" was obiter dictum), and low-level aviation 
(takeoffs and landings) would only be a contingent possibility. Nevertheless, the use of near- 
earth airspace over specific lands, by the government or under its auspices, may trigger compen- 
sation if subjacent owners are injured. Criggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962). But cf. 
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979), where extension of navigation easement to 
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Tortious acts of the government short of a taking of rights may, of 
course, be actionable if, as to them, sovereign immunity has been 
waived.e4 Actionable or not, however, the test of taking would be 
whether the government acts to detrimentally alter the factual predi- 
cates of the affected owner's rights. 
A typical right-depriving governmental act would be the ouster of 
an owner from pos~ession.~~ Such an ouster would constitute a taking 
of rights and not a mere violation of rights because the effect of an 
previous fast lands was held to require compensation; however, surface intrusions are probably 
more likely to result ipso facto in injury whereas avigational intrusions are not. 
Congress's declaration of the avigation easement rese~nbles a state law that permits counties to 
build roads and allows automobile speeds of up to 55 m.p.h. "unless otherwise posted." Such a 
law would not make it any less tortious to drive through my neighbor's yard at 55 m.p.h. 
without his permission. If the county, however, establishes a street through my neighbor's yard, 
as was done in Griggsv. Allegheny County with a landing approach, compensation could not be 
denied on the grounds that all drivers were obeying the traffic safety laws. Again, though, a law 
authorizing the county to put in the street would not trigger a taking until the street was 
established, and the congressionally declared avigation easement triggers no compensation until 
it is used to the point of injury cognizable under the just-compensation clause, viz., with such 
regularity an easement by prescription could, in time, arise. United States v .  Dickinson, 331 U.S. 
745, 748-49 (1947). Note that under Griggs, the taker of an easement who is liable to pay 
conipensation is the one whose actions prompted the overflights, not the authorizing government 
nor the private users acting under the taker's auspices. Cj.  Yearsley v. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 
18 (1940). 
One may query whether avigation easements will eventually achieve the status of navigation 
easements, viz., become such longstanding potential qualifications on the right of exclusivity and 
othcr forbearances that new burdens incidental to their exercise will be treated as non-compen- 
sable. See supra note 24. There is a good policy reason for resisting such a denouement. The 
navigation easement deprives an owner of only a peculiar advantage which he might otherwise 
enjoy as occupant of specially situated (riparian) lands, a peculiar advantage which he perhaps 
had no reason ever to expect to enjoy anyway. Ignorantia legis non excusat. However, the 
avigation easement deprives an owner of an ordinary advantage which he has every reason to 
expect to enjoy since there is no way of knowing in advance that an airport will become his 
neighbor. 
94. "It is elementary that '[tlhe United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it 
consents to be sued. . . ."' United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980), rehearitig 
deiiied, 446 U.S. 992 (1980) (quoting United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941)). The 
Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. $ 5  1346, 1402, 1504,2110, 2402, 2411-2412 and 2671-2680 
(1976 & Supp. 1979), and the Tucker Act, 36 Stat. 1093,28 U.S.C. $8 1346,1491 (1976 & Supp. 
1979), represent very extensive federal waivers of sovereign immunity. It is the Tucker Act, 
consenting to suit for claims, inter alia, under the Constitution and on express or implied 
contracts, which permits actions to enforce the just-compensation clause. See United States v. 
Dow, 357 U.S. 17, 21 (1958). See generally 6A P. N~CHOLS, supra note 1, 5 29.1. 
Sovereign immunity, in the absence of consent to be sued, is also enjoyed by the states. See 
ger~erally W. PROSSER, supra note 90, $ 131, at 975-77. Moreover, although the just-compensa- 
tion clause is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendnient, Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. 
v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236 (1897), the eleventh amendment precludes federal district court 
jurisdiction over inverse condemnation actions against the state. See Beck v. California, 479 F. 
Supp  392 (C.D. Cal. 1979); cf. Nasralah v. Barcelo, 465 F. Supp. 1273 (D.P.R. 1979). Supreme 
Court review of state court adjudication is not, however, precluded. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
See generally L. TRIBE, AMWCAN CONSTITUTIONAL L W $ 3-35, at  130-31 (1978). As to federal 
jurisdiction in actions against municipalities, see Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, (1980); Monell 
v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); cf. Cabrera v. Bayamon, 652 F. 2d 91, 99 
n.5 (1st Cir. 1977). 
05. See cases cited supra note 85. 
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ouster is to deprive the owner of possession, a prior-existing predicate 
for causes of action.Qe Another right-depriving governmental act 
would be a set of repeated trespasses by means of which the govern- 
ment acquires an easement by inverse c o n d e m n a t i ~ n . ~ ~  Such re- 
peated trespasses, unlike isolated trespasses, would deprive the owner 
of the history of exclusivity which is the factual predicate for legal 
actions to redress future incursions, analogously to situations where 
private easements are acquired by prescription. A taking also may 
occur when legal actions previously available against others than the 
government are drawn beneath the umbrella of sovereign immunity, 
as when the government acquires property which was subject to a 
private lien.08 
The government's power to invoke sovereign immunity complicates 
this analysis when applied to takings of affirmative easements by 
inverse c o n d e m n a t i ~ n . ~ ~  The operative fact of such takings is a 
course of repeated trespasses by the governmentloo resulting in an 
easement which can, in turn, legitimate subsequent incursions. Be- 
cause of the government's power to invoke sovereign immunity, how- 
ever, the owner may never have had any possible causes of action to 
prevent governmental trespasses in the first place.lol If not, then 
from the above definition of right it would follow that the owner may 
not lose any rights at all when the government acquires an affirmative 
easement by inverse c o n d e m n a t i ~ n . ' ~ ~  
96. Possession is required to bring an action in trespass or nuisance. E.g . ,  Gillespie v. Dew, 1 
Stew. 229 (Ala. 1827) (trespass); Klassen v. Central Kan. Coop. Creamery Ass'n, 160 Kan. 697, 
705, 165 P.2d 601, 607 (1946) (nuisance). See generally W. PROSSER, s t~pra  note 90, 5 13, at 68- 
69; 8 89, at 593-94. 
97. See inpa  notes 100-08 and accompanying text. 
98. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960) (materialman's lien). The lien became 
unenforceable by reason of sovereign immunity once the subject property was acquired by the 
government. 
99. See supra note 30. 
100. See United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 749, 751 (1947) (intermittent flooding; 
analogized to easement by prescription); Jacobs v .  United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933) (intermit- 
tent flooding); Portsmouth Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922) (repeated shooting over 
private land). 
101. There is some support for this view. According to Justice Holmes: "A sovereign is exempt 
from suit . . . on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right against the 
authority that makes the law on which the right depends." Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 
349, 353 (1907). 
However, Holmes's conclusion is compelled by neither logic nor practicality. Logically, a 
sovereign which specifies behavioral requirements and sanctions for non-observance can do so 
equally with regard to itself and to its legal subjects. As noted earlier, supra note 54, as a purely 
practical matter the sovereign's self-imposed requirements and consequences are no more and no 
less at the sovereign's whim than those imposed by the sovereign on others. At best, Holmes's 
statement reflects the arbitrary definitional limitations on the concept of "law properly so called" 
which are implicit in Austinian positivism, viz., that law is a command of the sovereign backed 
up by a sanction. J .  AUSTIN. THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 11-16, 253-56 (1954). 
See R. DIAS, supra note 49, at  457-80. 
102. It is not necessarily the case that, where the government takes an affirmative easement, 
the right of exclusivity is lost only as against the government. See. e . g . .  Kaiser Aetna v .  United 
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The analytical exit from this circle is to expand slightly upon the 
definition of "right" in order to specify the relation between rights and 
sovereign immunity: As against the government, rights are stipulated 
to include the entitlements to legal recourse which a person would 
have but for sovereign immunity alone. Phrased differently, sovereign 
immunity is viewed to mean not that private owners have no rights 
against the government, but only that, without the government's 
consent, the courts cannot enforce those rights.lo3 This definition of 
rights in relation to sovereign immunity is consistent with the decided 
cases. 
Sovereign immunity has been allowed to shelter the government 
from liability for isolated trespasses.'04 When the government com- 
mits repeated trespasses, however, amounting to the enjoyment of an 
easement-type of interest, the cases have required compensation for 
such inverse condemnations of affirmative easements. lo5 The govern- 
ment's course of action in such cases has not been regarded merely as 
trespasses, actionable or not, depending on the waiver of sovereign 
immunity as to torts.lo6 Rather, such repeated trespasses are treated 
States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (extension of public easement for navigation to former private fast 
lands); Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962) (public easement of avigation), discussed 
at length in Dunham, supra note 8, at 84-90; cf. United Statcs v.  Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882) 
(ejectment allowed against federal officials who took possession of land without bringing con- 
demnation proceedings). 
103. There is also support for this view. First, the very jargon of sovereign immunity ("con- 
sent to be sued," "waiver," and the term "immunity" itself) implies that the doctrine stands 
between the right-holder and his remedy, but not as the annihilator of the right itself. See United 
States v. Alabama, 313 U.S. 274, 281-82 (1941) (liens on property acquired by United States are 
not enforceable but nevertheless valid); accord Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960). 
Similar support is found in the cases which hold that consent-to-suit legislation such as the 
Tucker Act, see supra note 94, creates only jurisdiction and not any substantive rights, implying 
that the rights pre-exist the waiver of sovereign immunity. E.g. ,  United States v. Mitchell, 445 
U.S. 535, 538 (1980). 
Second, the ancient substantive counterpart of sovereign immunity-that "the King can do no 
wrongw-does not, by definition, have any apparent application to a government of limited 
constitutional powers. For example, if the government were to take "private property . . . for 
public use, without just compensation," the act would have to be considered a legal wrong if the 
constitutional just-compensation clause has any meaning at all. The wrong may not be compen- 
sable because of sovereign immunity, see supra note 94, but the absence of a remedy does not 
ipso facto make the act rightful. See Hart, The Power of Congress to Litnit the Power of the 
Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L.  REV. 1362, 1370-71 (1953). 
To be sure, constitutions can be amended and thus, perhaps, in an ultimate sense no govern- 
ment is constitutionally limited and, hence, can do substantive wrong. Nevertheless, until such 
legitimizing amendments are adopted, American governments are legally constrained by the 
amendment procedures and the ambient constitutional text, as interpreted. The protections 
therein promised-whatever Austin or Holmes may say-are properly denominated consitu- 
tional law. See supra note 101 for references to Austin and Holmes; see also supra note 54. 
Nevertheless, the distinction made here is fairly metaphysical, and the point is best resolved by 
inference from the decided cases which follow infra. 
104. See supra note 88. 
105. See cases cited supra notes 86 and 100. 
106. Justice Black argued for the restricted viewpoint in his dissent in United States v. 
Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 269-70 (1946). That case involved an inverse condemnation of an 
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as the operative facts of right deprivations and therefore, compensable 
takings, irrespective of whether sovereign immunity has been waived 
as to the tort of trespass itself.lo7 Accordingly, to account for the 
cases, the definition of rights for purposes of the rightlfreedom anal- 
ysis should include entitlements to legal recourse which an owner 
would have but for sovereign immunity alone. Consonant with this 
definition sovereign immunity merely affects the availability of a 
remedy for tortious governmental acts in violation of an owner's 
rights, not the existence of the rights themselves.108 
B .  Se~vitude Deprivation Cases 
Where the government deprives an owner of an existing affirmative 
easement over another's land or of access onto a road or street, the 
owner loses a freedom to use and enjoy the servient land, road, or 
street and, derivatively, the freedom to use his own land may be 
curtailed. Such easement and access deprivations are compensated.109 
Under the rightlfreedom analysis, the basis for such compensation is 
avigation easement. Black's position was that the overflights were at best torts and at that time 
immune from action because of sovereign immunity. The majority, ho\i~e\~er, did not accept this 
just trespassing defense where the overflights were frequent, regular, and at low altitudcs. 
107. The appropriateness of this view is further suggested by the apparent just-compensation 
clause policy to put the government on approximately thc sanie footing as private persons with 
respect to the acquisition or destruction of property rights, whatever may be its sovereign 
immunity with respect to ordinary civil actions. See supra text accompanying notes 21-24. 
108. From this it should follow that the withdrawal by the government of a wai\~er of 
sovereign immunity would not constitute a compensable taking. Cf. Martinez v. California, 444 
U.S. 277, 281-82 (1980); Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960) (dissenting opinion) (no 
compensation for losses which are a consequential incidence of sovereign immunity). A case such 
as Armstrong u. United States, see supra note 98 and accompanying text, is, ho\ire\~er, distin- 
guishable since there the government was not withdrawing a waiver of sovereign immunity but 
rather bringing within the immunity's reach a potential cause of action not previously subjcct to 
it. The taking may thus be viewed as the act of strhjecting an existing right to a newr limitation 
(consent of sovereign sued). Accord Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (extension 
of navigational servitude to previously fast lands). By contrast, rights against government are 
always subject to the consent limitation; thus, a withdrawal of its waiver of sovereign immunity 
does not result in any new limitation on such rights and, hence, no taking. Cf. strpra note 24 
(regarding private losses from exercise of the navigation easement). 
109. E.g.,  United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624 (1961) (took affirmative 
"flowage" easement); United States v. Welch, 217 U.S. 333 (1910) (private easement flooded). 
For an in-depth discussion of the access deprivation cases, as well as some of the definitional 
problems which cloud them, see Stoebuck, The Property Right of Access Versrrs the Power of 
Eminent Domain, 47 TEX. L. REV. 733 (1969). 
Where access is lost as a result of a change of street grade, an anomaly rooted in history 
prevents uniform application of the rightlfreedom analysis. Lines of authority dating back to the 
case of Callender v. Marsh, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 418 (1823) deny compensation in such change-of- 
grade situations and, as such, represent continued influence within a narrow sphere of the now 
generally repudiated physical intrusion criterion of taking. See Stoebuck, supra note 15, at 
314-19, 757-60. Under the change-of-grade cases, neither takings of rights nor takings of free- 
doms are compensable, but on the obsolete ground that the change-of-grade involves no physical 
intrusion. Such results are inconsistent with the prediction of the rightlfreedom analysis, viz., 
that the taking of rights, which they involve, will be compensable. 
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not the owner's loss of his freedom to use but his loss of the right to the 
government's forbearance from interfering with his affirmative ease- 
ment (right of use) over the neighboring land, road, or street."O This 
result may be described as a compulsory transfer or release of such 
right to the government, typically as servient owner, into whose title 
the right, and easement, merge. As was the case with takings of 
possessory title or new affirmative easements, though, the rightlfree- 
dom dichotomy plays no visible role here since both rights and free- 
doms are taken. 
A similar situation is presented by the cases where the government 
takes an existing negative easement which someone owns with respect 
to neighboring land or takes a natural servitude in the nature of a 
negative easement over neighboring land. In both situations a taking 
is now generally held to occur."' Likewise, when the government 
acquires a servitude to burden private land with a nuisance, many 
cases now require a payment of c~mpensat ion."~ This might be 
expected since the duty of a landowner to refrain from nuisancesH3 is 
a kind of natural servitude, in the nature of a negative ea~ement . "~  In
these situations, the government's act has caused a private owner to 
lose the right to have the neighboring owner, the government, for- 
bear, either as restricted by the negative easement or as required by 
the law of natural servitudes or nuisance. The loss of such rights may 
also be accompanied by an impairment of use and enjoyment, but it is 
the loss of the rights, not the impaired use, which would be control- 
ling under the rightlfreedom analysis. 
110. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
111. E . g . ,  Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 625 (1963) (natural riparian servitude entitling 
owner to non-interference with continued flow; analogized to taking of affirmative easement); 
United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950) (natural drainage servitude); 
Adaman Mut. Water Co. v. United States, 278 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1960) (affirmative servitude to 
pay assessments); Town of Stamford v. Vuono, 108 Conn. 359, 143 A. 245 (1928) (simile); Allen 
v. City of Detroit, 167 Mich. 464, 133 N.W. 317 (1911) (restrictive covenant). See generally 2 P. 
N~ccro~s ,  upra note 1, 5 5.73; Stoebuck, supra note 15, at  301-10. The only constitutional 
ground offered by cases contra seems to be that restrictive covenants are not property-a 
throwback to the obsolete physical-intrusion criterion of taking. See Stoebuck, supra note 15 at 
301-10, and supra note 109. 
112. E.g., Ferguson v. City of Keene, 108 N.H. 409, 238 A.2d 1 (1968); Thornburg v. Port of 
Portland, 233 Or. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962); Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 309,391 P.2d 
540 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989 (1965). But cf. Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 
U.S. 546 (1914) (private nuisance, but not public nuisance, a compensable taking); Batten v. 
United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963) (no taking 
without either total deprivation of use or physical invasion). 
113. I.e., to refrain from acts which substantially and unreasonably interfere with others' use 
and enjoyment of their land. See supra note 58. 
114. See cases cited in supra note 112. As was the case with respect to takings of negative 
easements and change-of-grade, there is authority to the contrary. Again, these lines of cases 
trace back to precedents from the time when the physical test of taking held sway and the only 
rights which were thought to be compensable were the rights of exclusivity. See Ferguson v. City 
of Keene, 108 N.H. 409, 238 A.2d 1 (1968). As atavistic holdovers from a time when the evident 
policy of the law was different, these results have an acceptable explanation which does not 
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C. Regulation Cases-Acquisition of Negative Easements 
Finally, this leaves the cases where the government acquires a 
negative easement that impresses a new servitude on a private owner's 
land. Such acquisitions may be accomplished compulsorily by con- 
d e m n a t i ~ n , " ~  but because negative easements do not involve a physi- 
cal intrusion by the holder onto the servient land, they cannot be 
acquired by inverse condemnation as that term is generally under- 
stood.lle That is to say, we cannot speak of a requirement that the 
government pay for carrying on an intrusive activity which would be 
actionableH7 but which is not, as against the government, enjoin- 
able. 
Nevertheless, when the government adopts land-use regulations, it 
acquires, in practical effect, compulsory negative easements in gross 
over the regulated land.Hg Such regulations create new rights in the 
government to enforce acts or forbearances on the part of landowners, 
and, correspondingly, may affect the burdened landowner adversely. 
Thus, the suspicion is raised that such police-power regulations may 
be, in effect, compensable takings. Under the rightlfreedom analysis, 
however, such land-use regulations would not per se be considered 
compensable takings because, though they reduce the owner's free- 
doms to use and enjoy by imposing duties on the owner, they do not 
affect or reduce his rights as such. This prediction of the rightlfree- 
dom analysis, with reconcilable exceptions,120 is in fact the law. 
As early as 1887, in Mugle~  v. Kansas,12' the Supreme Court de- 
clared that police-power limitations on land use were simply outside 
the purview of the just-compensation ~ 1 a u s e . I ~ ~  
A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are 
declared, by ualid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals or 
safety of the community, cannot, in any sense, be deemed a taking or an 
appropriation of property for the public benefit.lZ3 
detract from the framework of theory for modern cases set forth in this Article. See generally 
supra notes 15 and 109. 
115. See 3 P. N I C H O L S ,  supra note 1, 5 9.221[1]. 
116. See supra note 30. 
117. It is subject to the consent requirements of sovereign immunity. See supra note 94. 
118. See supra text accompanying notes 90-107. Federal takings by eminent domain cannot 
be enjoined so long as adequate provision for compensation is made, and the power to sue the 
compensation in federal courts amounts to such a provision. Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U . S .  95, 104 
(1932); Crozier v. Friederick Krupp A.S., 224 U . S .  290, 306 (1912). 
119. See supra text accompanying notes 34-40. 
120. See injra text accompanying notes 125-56. 
121. 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (upheld prohibition on manufacture and sale of alcoholic beverages, 
adversely affecting plaintiffs brewery). 
122. Concerning the police power, see supra note 3 and infia text accompanying notes 
125-38. For the qualification of this flat declaration for situations where the regulation goes too 
far, see Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U . S .  393 (1922), considered at text accompanying 
infro notes 139-44. 
123. Id. at 668-69 (emphasis added); accord Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 
U.S. 104 (1978); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U . S .  590 (1962). See generally Donald- 
son, supra note 11, at 198-201; Sax, supra note 8, at 38-46; Van Alstyne, supra note 8, at 3-48. 
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The Court's language does imply that some external test of injurious- 
ness might be imposed through judicial review. Later holdings, how- 
ever, make it clear that the police power is not limited to eradicating 
conditions which are injurious by any narrow definition.lZ4 Never- 
theless, there are limits on the police power imposition of use, i.e., 
freedom, restrictions without compensation of affected owners. The 
explanatory power of the rightlfreedom analysis depends on its ability 
to accommodate those limits. 
D. Limits on Police-Power Regulations 
There are historically two distinct kinds of limitations on the regu- 
lations which may be imposed under the police power, each having its 
own distinct policy justifications and separate lines of supporting 
authorities. In Agins v .  City of T i b ~ r o n , ~ ~ ~  the United States Supreme 
Court recently made a combined and somewhat confused reference to 
the two kinds of limits: 
T h e  application of a general zoning l aw  to  a particular property effects a 
taking if the ordinance does not  substantially advance legitimate state 
interests, o r  [if it] denies a n  owne r  economically viable use of his land.  Iz8 
The first type of limit referred to, the one also mentioned in Mugler, 
corresponds essentially to the limits on the scope, albeit extensive, of 
the police power itself, and is rooted in the due process clauses of the 
C o n s t i t u t i ~ n . ~ ~ ~  The second, essentially an interpretation of the just- 
124. See infra notes 125-38 and accompanying text; see also supra note 8. For example, in 
Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405 (1935), the Court stated that "the police 
power embraces regulations designed to promote the public convenience or the general welfare, 
and not merely those in the interest of public health, safety and morals." Id. at 429. In Goldblatt 
v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962), the Court described the criterion as simply 
"reasonableness." 
125. 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (density restrictions). 
126. Id. at 260 (citations omitted); accord Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 
U.S. 104, 127 (1978) (citations omitted): "[A] use restriction on real property may constitute a 
'taking' if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public purpose, or perhaps 
if it has an unduly harsh impact upon the owner's use of the property." 
127. U.S. CONST. amend. V: "Nor shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. . . ."Accord U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see supra note 3. 
"Legislatures may not, under the guise of the police power, impose restrictions that are unneces- 
sary and unreasonable upon the use of private property or the pursuit of useful activities." 
Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 121 (1928). See cases cited 
injra notes 128-31 and 135. 
Whether the scope of the police power defines, in part, what is substantive due process, or 
rather substantive due process delimits the scope of the police power, is a chicken-and-egg 
qutstion which need not be addressed. See Donaldson, supra note 11, at 194-97. 
The fourteenth amendment requirement of "equal protection of the laws" may also provide a 
possible limit on the ~ o l i c e  power in certain cases. See County Bd. of Arlington County v. 
Richards, 434 U.S. 5 (1977) (upholding ordinance which, on its face, rationally promotes 
legitimate social and environmental objectives). Since a developed case law on the matter as it 
relates to land use is lacking, and as the analytical "fit" of equal protection is seemingly identical 
to that of due process, equal protection will not be separately treated in the discussion that 
follows. 
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compensation clause, treats freedom regulations as takings if they go 
"too far. ,, 
The first kind of limit on land-use regulations is concerned with 
whether, on broad balance, public objectives exist which justify the 
burden that a given regulation may impose on private interests, i.e., 
whether the restrictions have a "reasonable relationship" to some 
public Thus, as stated in the landmark zoning case, 
Village of Euclid v .  Ambler Realty Co.,lZ9 a restriction would be 
unconstitutional if it is "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no 
substantial relation to public health, safety, morals, or general wel- 
fare."130 
Although the reasonable relationship principle has a rather long 
history,131 it is well accepted that substantive due process standards do 
not place particularly stringent limitations on the government's power 
to act upon or regulate economic interests.132 This has not been a 
consequence of an announced abandonment of principle; rather, it is 
the result of the increased judicial deference to legislative determina- 
tions in economic due process cases since the late 1 9 3 0 ' ~ . ' ~ ~  Neverthe- 
less, perhaps influenced by the property protective policy of the just- 
compensation clause, police-power restrictions on freedom to use 
property sometime seem to receive somewhat stricter due process 
scrutiny than do economic interests generally. This is true especially in 
128. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499-500 (1977) (regulations must 
rationally further some legitimate state purpose); see infra note 134; cf. Pruneyard Shopping 
Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 85 (1980) (quoting test of Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 
(1934): "[Tlhe law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious and . . . the means selected 
shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained.") As recited 
somewhat more elaborately in Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-95 (1962), 
"To justify the State in . . . interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, 
that the interests of the public . . . require such interference; and, second, that the means are 
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon 
individuals." (quoting Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894)). Discriminatory regulations 
in violation of the equal protection clause may also fall into this general rubric. See County Bd. 
of Arlington County v. Richards, 434 U.S. 5 (1977). 
129. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). See generally Annot., 52 I , .  Ed. 2d 863 (1977). 
130. 272 U.S. at 395. The reasonable relationship principle was applied two years after 
Euclid to strike down, and not compensate, zoning regulations in Washington ex re[. Seattle 
TitleTrust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928) and Nectow v.  City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 
(1928). The principle was more recently invoked in the Court's plurality opinion and Justice 
Steven's concurring opinion in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
131. See Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894), as quoted by Coldblatt in supra note 
130. The doctrine's more recent history is somewhat checkered. See generally McCloskey, 
Economic Due Process: An Exhumation And Reburial, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 34. 
132. See L. %BE, supra note 94, 5 8-7, at 450-51. 
133. In Euclid itself, the Court said "[ilf the validity of the legislative classification . . . be 
fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control." 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926). 
This judicial deference has grown to the point that "when the legislature has spoken, the public 
interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive." Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 
(1954). By 1963, "[tlhe doctrine . . . that due process authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitu- 
tional when they believe the legislature has acted unwisely-[had] long since been discarded." 
Ferguson v.  Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963). See generally L. TIUBE, supra note 94, § 8-7, at 
450-55; McCloskey, supra note 131, at 36-40. 
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state courts,134 though such stricter scrutiny possibly occurs also at the 
federal level as reflected by the relatively frequent mention of due 
process standards in cases of alleged police-power takings.'35 
At first glance, it certainly seems legitimate that the effects on 
property values of regulations that restrict freedoms might be taken 
into the calculus of the balancing implicit in substantive due process 
adjudication. For present purposes, however, the most important 
feature of reasonable relationship limits on the police power is that 
they supply a theoretical basis for invalidating land-use regulations 
which is separate and distinct, in both its textual roots and its policy 
rationale, from the requirement of just cornpensat i~n. '~~ Since due 
process requirements protect liberty as well as property, the reason- 
able relationship test may thus explain why regulations are sometimes 
struck down, especially in state courts,137 even though only freedoms, 
not rights, are impaired.138 
The other important limitation on the government's power to regu- 
late without compensation is the principle that regulations are to be 
treated as takings when they go "too far." The landmark case recog- 
nizing this second type of limitation is Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. 
M a h ~ n . ' ~ ~  Mahon involved statewide regulation which prohibited 
the mining of underground coal seams where such mining would 
deprive the surface owner of necessary subjacent support. The regula- 
tion in effect prohibited the plaintiff coal company from making any 
use whatsoever of the subsurface space and occupying substance 
134. For a compendious review of the state court cases, especially California, see Van 
Alstyne, supra note 8. Although Van Alstyne purports in his title to focus on inverse condemna- 
tion criteria, he might have better entitled his inquiry a "search for substantive due process 
criteria," since it is mostly the validity, not the conzpensability, of regulations which his cases 
concern. 
135. See Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980), discussed infra 
at text accompanying notes 211-15, where the Court examined the police power justification for 
a statute and held that it was without "reasonable basis" and an "arbitrary use of governmental 
powerv-"the very kind of thing that the taking clause of the Fifth Amendment was meant to 
prevent." 449 U.S. at 164. 
Other fairly recent Supreme Court examples include Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York 
City, 428 U.S. 104, 127, 133 n.29 (1978), quoted supra note 126; Goldblatt v. Town of 
Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-95 (1962), where the Court undertook to apply the reasonable 
relationship standard to a land-use regulation on excavations stating expressly that it was "still 
valid today." See supra note 128. 
In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), an ordinance limiting occupancy to 
"families," narrowly defined, was struck down on due process grounds. Due to the family life 
implications of the regulation, the case was not limited to purely economic due process factors. 
The case, however, only emphasizes the close relationship between property freedoms and 
personal freedoms. 
136. The distinction was explicitly recognized in the dissenting opinion, concurred in by four 
justices, in San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 656 11.23 (1981). See also 
Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith, quoted supra note 135. 
137. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
138. See infra notes 145-56 and accompanying text. 
139. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
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which it owned. In holding that such regulations of activities went 
"too far" and constituted a taking of property, Justice Holmes, for the 
Court, wrote: 
To make  it commercially impracticable t o  mine certain coal has very 
nearly t he  same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriat ing or  
destroying it. . . . [Wlhi le  property may be regulated to a certain extent, 
if regulation goes too fa r  it will be  recognized as a taking . . . this is a 
question of degree. . . .140 
Although the Court's decision in Mahon was that the Pennsylvania 
regulation effected a taking under the fifth and fourteenth amend- 
ments, no payment of just compensation was exacted. Rather the 
Court declared the regulation invalid through the implicit application 
of another substantive due process principle: to take property for 
public use without compensation is not due process of law.141 
In terms of the rightlfreedom analysis, the rationale of Mahon and 
similar cases142 is this: when a regulation of freedom leaves a land- 
owner with no practical use of his land, the result is to render his right 
of exclusivity, though technically unimpaired, actually nugatory. To 
uphold such a regulation without compensation on the grounds that 
the owner's rights are not impaired is to ride an empty hoax. The 
rights in such circumstances would have no more significance to the 
owner than title to a square on the surface of the sun. By contrast, if 
the regulation leaves the landowner with the possibility of substantial 
use of his land, his rights of exclusivity are not a mere hollow shell, 
but a matter of substance, albeit of reduced value as a result of the 
regulation. In sum, activity restrictions which technically take only 
freedoms and not rights can so drastically undermine the purpose for 
which rights are sought and conferred as to be the functional equiva- 
lent of a taking of the rights themselves. How much is too much is, of 
course, not susceptible of exact f0rmu1ation.l~~ It would not be ap- 
propriate, however, for the concept of functional equivalency, as an 
escape valve exception to a general principle, to be limited by fixed 
parameters. 144 
140. Id. at 414-16; see also Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962) (a 
regulation can "be so onerous as to constitute a taking which constitutionally requires compensa- 
tion)"; Bartlett 1,. Zoning Comm'n, 161 Conn. 24, 31, 282 A.2d 907, 910 (1971) ("the plaintiffs 
use of his property is nonexistent unless he happens to own a boat"); State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 
711, 715 (Me. 1970); Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 232, 15 N.E.2d 587, 
591 (1938). The Mahon principle was reiterated with approval in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 
U.S. 255, 260 (1980), quotedsupra text accompanying note 126, and ostensibly applied in Kaiser 
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 178 (1979). 
141. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236 (1897), reaffirnled in Webb's 
Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 160 (1980). 
142. See cases cited ncpra note 140; cf. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928). 
143. Cases have evinced some variability in the judicial conception of how far is "too far." 
The Supreme Court has upheld regulations which reduced property values by 75% to 90%. See 
supra note 6. 
144. Although the rightlfreedom analysis does not provide a more precise formulation of the 
too far principle, it at least explains how the extent of police-power restrictions on use becomes 
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It has been argued that the holdings of cases such as M a h ~ n , ' ~ ~  
which find a taking where the value or usability of land is reduced 
"too much," are actually based on the substantive due process require- 
ment of a reasonable relationship to public objectives and do not 
really present just-compensation issues at all. 146 There is some plausi- 
bility in the argument since regulations which are, for example, un- 
duly oppressive on  individual^,'^' are theoretically subject to that 
substantive due process criticism. Recognition of an active substantive 
due process basis for striking down such regulations is not, however, 
without objection. To invoke substantive due process in these cases 
would create an enclave in the unmistakably contrary current policy 
of relaxed judicial scrutiny where government regulations affect only 
economic interests.14s Although, as previously suggested,149 such an 
enclave may be appropriate in view of the policy of the just-compen- 
sation clause, it is by no means necessary to explain cases like Mahon. 
Conversely, though, statements such as that of the Court in Agins v .  
City of T i b u ~ o n , ' ~ ~  that regulations which overreach the police power 
result in a taking, seem to miss the mark. What the stated operative 
facts of such overreachings really involve'51 is not a taking of property 
relevant. Formerly, the entitlements to use and enjoyment have been lumped together with 
other property interests, so that the question ~ o s e d  has been: How much property interest can be 
taken before there is a taking of "property"? With the question thus put, the logical but 
authoritatively incorrect answer would be none. Hence, the traditional analysis has failed to 
explain the too far rationale. 
By clarifying the dichotomy between property interest deprivations made in the police-power 
and just-compensation cases, the rightlfreedom analysis reveals the authoritatively operative 
frame of reference for adjudging what goes too far. A taking of freedom goes too far when it 
leaves no substantial purpose to be served by one or more rights. 
The methodological advance of providing such a frame of reference should contribute to the 
comprehensibility, and hence, uniformity and predictability of results. 
145. See supra note 140. 
146. E.g., Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 593-94, 350 
N.E.2d 381, 384-85, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 8-9 (1976) (taking as a metaphor for due process); 
Stoebuck, supra note 19, at 1097-99. In the four justice dissent in San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. 
San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 649 11.14 (1981), this interpretation of Mahon was said not merely to 
tamper "with the express language of the opinion . . . [but to ignore] the coal company's 
repeated claim . . . that the . . . statute took its property without just compensation.'' 
147. E.g., Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894), quoted supra note 128. 
148. See supra quotations in note 133. 
149. See supra text accompanying notes 133-34. 
150. See supra text accompanying note 126; see also passage from Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v .  
New York City, quoted supra note 126. 
151. The stated operative facts of these overreachings include no reasonable necessity, or lack 
of substantial public purpose, or undue oppression of private persons. Professor Van Alstyne's 
article, supra note 8, provides an excellent breakdown of the application of these factors at  the 
state court level. 
The idea of unduly harsh or unduly oppressive in Lawton o. Steele, and Pen11 Central, is not 
synonymous with too far. The idea of unduly implies a lack of a reasonable relationship between 
the governmental act and a public purpose. The idea of too far could have that reference but, as 
noted earlier, can also refer to freedoms-takings which are the functional equivalent of rights- 
takings. See supra text acc0,mpanying notes 142-44. 
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without just c o m p e n s a t i ~ n ' ~ ~  but, rather, a deprivation of property 
without the reasonable relationship to public objectives required by 
substantive due process of law.153 
The substantive due process requirements of a reasonable relation- 
ship and of just c ~ m p e n s a t i o n , ' ~ ~  though related in terms of constitu- 
tional philosophy, are nevertheless distinguishable. The just-compen- 
sation clause addresses the question of whether a particular valid 
government act has resulted in a taking which requires compensation; 
the more general substantive due process question is whether the act is 
a valid exercise of government power at all, irrespective of whether 
any property is taken or only freedom (liberty) is Confu- 
sion of the two serves no purpose and suggests that the government 
may exceed its constitutional powers as long as it pays a price to those 
who would complain.'56 
152. They may also involve such a taking. See it~jra text accompanying notes 157-69. 
153. See Stoebuck, supra note 19, at 1081-82, for a further discussion of this point. This 
author disagrees with Stoebuck's conclusion that Mahor~ is really a substantive due process rather 
than a takings case. Id. at 1097-98; seesrrpra note 146 and ir~fra text accompanying notes 157-69. 
154. See supra text accompanying note 141. 
155. Some governmental acts may exceed the scope of government authority even though any 
takings of property are compensated or no taking is involved at all, e.g., condemning my vintage 
Rolls-Royce to give it to my covetous neighbor, the city councilman; promoting a particular 
religious denomination. But cf. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 
(1980), discussed at text accompanying notes 211-15 injra, where property was taken for public 
use yet "no police power justification [was] offered for the deprivation." Other governmental 
acts, although otherwise legitimate exercises of the police power, nonetheless require that just 
compensation be paid to owners of affected private property, e.g., acquiring land to build an 
elementary school. Compensation upon the legitimate exercise of the government's taking power 
should be distinguished from damages for a wrongful governmental act. See San Diego Gas & 
Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 656 11.23 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting): 
[Wlhere a police power regulation is not enacted in furtherance of the public health, 
safety, morals or the general welfare so that there may be no "public use" . . . the 
government entity may not be forced to pay just compensation under the Fifth 
Amendment, [but] the landowner may nevertheless have a damage cause of action 
under 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 for a Fourteenth Amendment violation. 
See supra text at notes 98-108 for a discussion of sovereign immunity. 
156. That the government can exceed its powers for a price appears to be the clear import, 
though almost certainly not the intent, of the Supreme Court's alternatively phrased language 
quoted at supra note 126 and accompanying text. But see Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Co., 
300 U.S. 55, 80 (1937): "[Ojne person's property may not be taken for the benefit of another 
private person without a justifying public purpose, even though compensation be paid." 
There is yet another reason to avoid confusing the two limitations. Because the substantive due 
process standard of reasonable relationship is based upon different policy considerations than is 
the Mahon "too far" test, it may countenance freedoms-takings which are sometimes more and 
sometimes less extensive than permitted by Mahon. Indeed, substantive due process may allow 
for outright confiscations, not to mention imprisonment and the death penalty, at least in cases 
to which Mahon does not apply. Examples of valid confiscation include forfeiture for crime and 
the circumstances discussed injra text accompanying notes 185-221. 
Obviously, Mahon applies to the kinds of governmental acts at issue under its facts, i.e., 
regulations limiting activities in general and limiting land-use activities in particular. Therefore, 
its test would seem to work as a kind of outer limit on the validity of uncompensated regulatory 
takings, a limit which would sometimes be more restrictive on the government than the reason- 
able relationship principles. There are some state court decisions which appear to belie this 
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E .  Some Implications f o ~  Remedies 
The question of remedies for invalid regulations is one of consider- 
able current interest.157 Moreover, it is a question which can be 
addressed from a clear perspective only if we do not confuse the 
distinction between the requirements of just compensation for takings 
and of the reasonable relationship test for regulatory validity. 
In Agins v .  City of T ibu~on , l~*  the California Supreme Court held 
that only mandamus or declaratory relief, but not monetary compen- 
sation, would be available to landowners adversely affected by exer- 
cises of police powers beyond constitutional limits: 159 " [ A ]  land- 
owner . . . may not . . . elect to sue in inverse condemnation and 
thereby transmute an excessive use of the police power into a lawful 
taking for which compensation in eminent domain must be paid."leO 
The United States Supreme Court did not reach the remedies issue 
in its review of Agins nor in the more recent case of Sun Diego Gas G 
Electric Co. v .  Sun Diego.lel In Sun Diego, however, four dissenting 
justices with the apparent concurrence of a fifth, were of the view 
that the California court's opinion in Agins "fails to recognize the 
essential similarity of regulatory 'takings' and other 'takings,' " and 
that unconstitutional regulatory takings, even if temporary, should be 
compensated. l g 2  
Under the rightlfreedom analysis, these views can be reconciled, 
and both would seem to be correct, strictly speaking, as long as the 
"reasonable relationship" and "too far" tests are not confused. The 
four Sun Diego justices who dissented are correct that compensation 
should be paid when, absent such compensation, a regulation would 
be unconstitutional as a taking because it goes too far-an equivalent 
to a taking of rights.le3 The California Supreme Court, however, is 
seemingly also correct that an excessive exercise of the police power, 
conclusion, e.g., Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 
342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638 (1962), appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962) (regulation deprived land of 
all economic use), and in doing so look upon drastic use restriction as though the reasonable 
relationship test, subject to very relaxed scrutiny, were the only limitation on police-power 
regulations. For better or for worse, this does not seem to result from any deliberate rejection of 
the Mahon principle, but merely from the court's confounding it with the more general concep- 
tions of substantive due process. 
157. The Supreme Court nearly faced this issue twice during the past year. In neither case, 
however, was the question of remedies considered to be ripe for constitutional adjudication. See 
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); San 
Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981). 
158. 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). 
159. Id. at 273, 598 P.2d at 28. 
160. Id. 
161. 450 U.S. 621 (1981). 
162. Id. at 651; see also Keystone Assoc. v. Moerdler, 19 N.Y .2d 78, 224 N.E.2d 700, 278 
N.Y.S.2d 185 (1966). 
163. See supra te*t accompanying notes 139-44. 
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an act beyond its scope, without a justifying reasonable relationship, 
is not ips0 facto such a taking.le4 The rightlfreedom analysis takes no 
position on whether such an excessive exercise regulation should re- 
quire compensation at all,'" only that the just-compensation clause 
would not be the basis for such a remedy if the regulation does not go 
too far and only freedoms are affected. 
The availability of a monetary remedy in cases like Agins and Sun 
Diego should thus ultimately depend on (1) whether the regulation of 
freedom went "too far" under the Mahon test, or (2) if the regulation 
did not go too far but is nevertheless unconstitutional, whether such 
unconstitutional regulations are compensable apart from the just- 
compensation clause. Assuming that unconstitutional freedom impair- 
ments are not compensable, it becomes especially important to clarify 
whether a particular loss-inflicting governmental act is merely ultra 
v i r e ~ , ' ~ ~  is ultra vires and a taking or its equi~alent , '~ '  or is merely a 
taking or e q u i ~ a l e n t . ' ~ ~  The three appropriate remedies would be, 
respectively, (a) declaratorylmandamus relief only, (b) declaratory1 
mandamus relief plus compensation for the interim taking, and (c) 
compensation for taking only. In any event, to emphasize, consistency 
of treatment would require compensation whenever, by governmen- 
tal act, rights are taken for public use or freedoms are impaired to 
such a degree as to evacuate the substance of a right. This compensa- 
tion is constitutionally required independently of whether lesser free- 
dom impairments, not within Mahon, may be compensable on some 
other basis. Confusing the "too far" test of taking and the "reasonable 
relationship" test of validityle9 would be a most unsound basis for 
denying such compensation. 
164. 24 Cal. 3d at 272, 598 P.2d at 28; seesupra text accompanying notes 128-38 and 154-56. 
Unfortunately, though the California Supreme Court's view is, strictly speaking, correct as far as 
it goes, that court is rather clearly confusing the "too far" test with the "reasonable relationship" 
test and thus would deny compensation where, under the former, it is constitutionally required. 
See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d at 274, 598 P.2d at 29; strpra notes 146 and 156 and 
accompanying text., 
165. The four dissenters in San Diego suggested that such compensation may be required 
under 42 U.S.C. $ 1983 (1976). 450 U.S. at 656 n.23; see supra quotation in note 155. 
166. E.g. ,  the invalid zoning regulations in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 
(1977); Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928); Nectow v. 
Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928). 
167. For example, where the government requisitions my vintage Rolls-Royce to give it to the 
covetous city councilman. See Keystone Assoc. v. Moerdler, 19 N.Y.2d 78, 224 N.E.2d 700, 28 
N.Y.S.2d 185 (1966) (temporary use prohibition without public purpose). 
168. E.g., in Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979), where the extension to 
previous fast lands of the navigation servitude would be valid if conlpensation were paid. Accord 
Delaware, Lackawanna & W.R.R. v. Morristown, 276 U.S. 182, 193 (1928). 
169. This may be occurring in California. See supra note 164. 
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F. Affirmative Duty Impositions 
In the past, two types of cases have proved to be particularly 
intractable to commentators on police-power takings:170 railroad 
grade-crossing cases17' and utility relocation cases.172 Both concern 
regulations requiring private interests to bear the costs of accommo- 
dating their installations, tracks or utility conduits, to public thor- 
oughfares or improvements, viz., by modifying or eliminating grade 
crossings or by relocating conduits. 
Under the rightlfreedom analysis, no takings should be found in 
these cases as they do not involve any reductions of rights but merely 
impositions of affirmative duties. Such requirements still might be 
invalidated on a substantive due process or, perhaps, equal protection 
basis,'73 and prior to the 1937-1940 shift in judicial review philosophy 
this had 0 ~ c u r r e d . l ~ ~  In general, though, such requirements have 
typically been treated as an affirmative version of freedom restric- 
tions. Instead of imposing a duty to forbear from particular behavior, 
as does a typical land-use freedom restriction, they impose affirmative 
duties-to act.'75 Whether affirmative or negative, however, duty 
impositions do not in and of themselves involve any taking of rights 
and thus, under the rightlfreedom analysis, one would expect that 
both affirmative and negative duties may be imposed without com- 
pensating the persons affected. Land-use regulations may, of course, 
involve affirmative duties as well as negative duties,'7e though our 
focus has been on the latter. 
170. E . g . ,  Dunham, supra note 8, at 73-75; Sax, supra note 8, at 70; Stoebuck, supra note 15, 
at 298-301; Van Alstyne, supra note 8, at 48-56. 
171. E . g . ,  Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 346 U.S. 346 (1953) (require- 
ment valid); Nashville, C .  & St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405 (1935) (requirement could be 
invalid); Erie R.R. v. Board of Pub. Utils. Comm'rs, 254 U.S. 394 (1921) (requirement valid); 
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry, v. City of Minneapolis, 232 U.S. 430 (1914) (requirement valid). 
172. E . g . ,  Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. State Highway Comm'n, 294 U.S. 613 (1935) 
(requirement invalid); Passaic Water Co. v. Board of Pub. Utils. Comm'rs, 254 U.S. 394 (1921) 
(requirement valid). 
173. They also would presumably be subject to limitations under the principle of Pennsyloa- 
nia Coal Co.  v .  Mahon. See supra text accompanying notes 139-44. 
174. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. State Highway Comm'n, 294 U.S. 613 (1935); see also 
Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 429 (1935) (no "reasonable relation"); cf. 
the post-1937 case of Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 346 U.S. 346 (1953) 
(similar requirement upheld). Outcomes of cases since 1937-1940, mostly in state courts, can 
probably be understood entirely in terms of the courts' attitudes toward substantive due process 
standards. For a review of the cases, see Stoebuck, supra note 15, at 298-301; Van Alstyne, supra 
note 8, at 48-56. 
175. Affirmative duty impositions are restrictions on the freedom to omit certain behavior. 
176. E.g., in Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), the historic 
preservation legislation there approved by the Court required the owner to preserve his building 
as a landmark at his own expense; see also Curtin v. Benson, 222 U.S. 78 (1911), where the court 
assumed that the government could constitutionally require an owner to erect fences or other- 
wise prevent his cattle from straying, but could not prohibit grazing altogether (in anticipation 
of Mahon?). 
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To recapitulate the application of the rightlfreedom analysis to the 
cases, we have seen the following: First, the rightlfreedom analysis 
correctly predicts that the standard non-police-power cases of eminent 
domain, trespassory and non-trespassory, do require compensation; 177 
however, since both rights and freedoms are generally lost in such 
cases, the basic rightlfreedom distinction often does not play a visible 
role in them. Second, the rightlfreedom analysis correctly predicts 
that, in general, government regulations affecting land use will not 
constitute compensable takings because such regulations take only 
freedoms and not rights. The rightlfreedom analysis readily accom- 
modates, however, two kinds of limits on thepolice power to regulate 
land use, even though both involve takings only of freedoms and not 
rights. The two kinds of limits are that: (a) such regulations may go 
"too far" and, if they do, they will be treated as the equivalent of a 
taking of rights, and (b) the validity of such government regulations 
still depends in theory on consistency with substantive due process 
limitations on the ways government may regulate. Why these general 
rules should be as they are, and some of the analytical implications of 
the rationale, will be next considered. 
G .  A Possible Policy Explanation 
The rightlfreedom dichotomy is purely descriptive of the outcomes 
of decided cases and therefore contains no axiological rationale in 
itself. Nevertheless, by clarifying a distinction which the cases in fact 
make, the rightlfreedorn analysis facilitates informed speculation as to 
policy rationales. Why should takings of land-related rights be com- 
pensable while takings of land-related freedoms should not? 
One answer may be borne of practical necessity. Police-power re- 
strictions on land use are by definition takings only of freedoms.178 
177. The only important exceptions are some state court and lower federal court holdings 
which deny compensation for certain non-trespassory takings, and these may be viewed as 
vestigesof a now obsolete understanding of property. Seestrpra notes 15, 109, 111, 112, and 114. 
178. Restrictions on new activity cannot directly affect property rights in land because none 
of these rights are predicated on any required activity by the holder. 
Two technical objections can be made to the statements of the preceding paragraph, but do 
not, on analysis, present genuine qualifications. 
First, it might be objected that possession is a kind of activity and is the predicate of the right 
of exclusivity, enforceable by actions of trespass or ejectment. A governmental prohibition of 
possession, however, is not a mere use restriction but is identical to a taking of the right of 
exclusivity itself-taking the freedom to possess and taking the right to exclude are the same 
thing-and is treated as such. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); cases cited 
supra note 85. 
The second possible objection concerns the activity of bringing lawsuits. Regulations that limit 
or proscribe this activity-by limiting or eliminating causes of action or access to the courts-are 
in real effect right-depriving, and not merely freedom-affecting; such regulations should prob- 
ably amount to compensable takings. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960), 
discussed supra note 108. To speak precisely, however, the cause of action aspect of a "right" 
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Freedom reductions, directed at land use or otherwise, will almost 
always affect the usability of owned objects. Yet, the government 
could not undertake to compensate all such freedom takings and 
use-impairments without practically paralyzing itself in its regulatory 
function.170 Of course, a given freedom reduction may affect the use 
of some objects of property more than others-imprisonment, by 
analogy, may affect the use of one's automobile more than the use of 
one's wristwatch. lsO Considerations of substantive due process ls l  
may limit the extent to which such use-impairment burdens, or any 
other burdens, may be visited upon private persons by government.ls2 
It nevertheless remains that governmental acts which merely limit 
freedoms of activities, even though property values are affected, could 
never be regular bases for compensation without an intolerable bur- 
den upon the law-making process itself. 
In contrast, when the government selectively and adventitiously 
withdraws the landowner's rights of exclusivity, or other rights to the 
forbearance of others, which rights the government routinely confers 
to persons generally, there is not merely a practical possibility of 
treating such withdrawals as regular bases for compensation, there 
are positive and longstanding policy reasons for doing so.ls3 Thus, 
the policy duality which results is that takings of land-related rights 
are compensated because it is desirable to do so and can be done, but 
presupposes not merely the freedom to sue, but the standing to bring successful lawsuits under 
certain contingencies. It is the law's provision for success which is the key to the concept of right, 
and this provision for success is not, as viewed from the right-holder's perspective, a rule which 
concerns his freedom of activities. Nonetheless, a provision for success, under the contingencies 
defined by the right, would be almost nugatory, except to justify self-help, if there were no 
freedom to bring suit in the first place. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960); cf.  
supra text accompanying notes 100-08 for a discussion of the analytical significance of sovereign 
immunity on the concept of rights as used herein. 
179. "Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not 
be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law." Pennsylvania Coal Co. 
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). "To require compensation in all such circumstances would 
effectively compel the government to regulate by purchase." Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 
(1979) (emphasis supplied). 
180. Freedom restrictions are not transmuted into property takings merely because they 
happen to affect the usefulness of certain property. See supra discussion at text accompanying 
notes 71-75. 
181. Or, possibly, equal protection. See County Bd. of Arlington County V. Richards, 434 
U.S. 5, rehearing denied, 434 U.S. 937 (1977). 
182. See supra text accompanying notes 127-38. 
183. The fifth amendment: 
prevents the public from loading upon one individual more than his just share of the 
burdens of government, and says that when he surrenders to the public something 
more and different from that which is exacted from other members of the public, a 
full and just equivalent shall be returned to him. 
Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893). 
Similarly, the object of the just-compensation clause is "to redistribute certain economic losses 
. . . so that they will fall upon the ~ u b l i c  rather than wholly upon those who happen to lie in the 
path of the project." United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945); accord 
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
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takings of land-related freedoms are not compensated because, 
whether or not it is desirable to do so, they cannot be.lS4 
VI. TAKING RIGHTS WITHOUT COMPENSATION : 
THE "PUBLIC USE" PROVISO 
There are occasions where governmental acts actually do take 
rights in property but nevertheless are not deemed compensable tak- 
ings. Before concluding, it is necessary to give an analytical account of 
such non-compensable takings. An example of a non-cornpensable 
taking is legislation removing ancient encumbrances or limitations on 
land titles,lE5 destroying the rights of those who formerly held those 
interests. Similar effects can result from statutory or judicial modifica- 
tions of the estate system1s6 and legislation which is deregulatory in 
effect.Is7 This consideration is best introduced by examining the 
relationship between freedom restrictions and rights. 
The imposition of restrictions on activities typically occurs in con- 
nection with the conferring of rights,ls8 e.g., when securities legisla- 
tion expands upon the common law definition of fraud,ls9 or when a 
regime of private property is instituted in the first place by creating 
actions such as trespass and ejectment.Ig0 However, with rare and 
184. The policy reasons set forth in the preceding text are offered only as suggestions. In fact, 
the rationale offered by the text tends to unravel a bit at the edges: For example, there may 
sometimes be sound policy reasons to expropriate rights en masse, where compensation would be 
all but impossible, e.g., by enactment of a marketable title statute extinguishing old but possibly 
not forgotten rights of title. See infra text accompanying notes 185-222. Indeed, such govern- 
ment takings are generally non-compensable though the rightlfreedom analysis can accommo- 
date such results. Id. In contrast, in some instances, takings of freedoms may be administratively 
quite easy to compensate, e.g., where a few landmark buildings are designated for historic 
preservation, such as in Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
185. E.g., marketable title statutes. See infra note 198. 
186. E.g., eliminating the destructability of contingent remainders or expanding the cy pres 
limitations on the rule against perpetuities. See, e .g . ,  N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW 
$5 6-5.10, 6-5.11 (McKinney 1981) (preserving contingent remainders); see also Estate of Ye 
Hop, 52 Hawaii 40, 469 P.2d 183 (1970) (cy pres); Berry v. Union Nat'l Bank, 262 S.E.2d 766 
(W. Va. 1980). 
187. Deregulation will be used to refer to any withdrawal of state-enforced restrictions on 
freedom, though often these withdrawals may sometimes look more like regulation than deregu- 
lation. See infra note 199. 
188. If the government's enforcement prerogatives are counted as legal actions, so that 
behavioral violations actionable by the government are treated as the subject of government's 
rights, then enforceable activity restrictions may always be said to confer rights. 
From the way in which right has been defined, this inclusion appears legitimate, though the 
emphasis in the textual discussion is that new regulations on freedom are often imposed in 
connection with the creation of new private and not governmental rights. 
189. E.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 5 10, 15 U.S.C. 78J (1976) and rule lob-5 
thereunder (17 C.F.R. 5 240.10b-5 (1981)), which makes mere non-disclosure actionable. 
190. The extension of the writ of ejectione firmae (ejectment) to leasehold tenants during the 
late 15th century allowed them to recover possession when wrongfully ousted, and may be seen 
as the point at which the modern concept of leases as property was crystallized. 3 W. 
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 213-17 (5th ed. 1942). 
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arguable exceptions,lg1 new activity restrictions can never reduce the 
rights of private citizens, as that concept is defined herein. 
Interestingly, although new regulations of activities per se do not 
generally occasion losses of rights, deregulation has precisely that 
effect by reducing previously existing potential causes of action.lg2 
Any governmental acts which modify or dismantle portions of the 
system of tortslg3 and contract actions,lg4 may be seen as deregulatory. 
Historical examples of deregulation include the abolition of actions for 
seduction and criminal c o n v e r s a t i ~ n , ~ ~ ~  of seisin jure u x o r i ~ ~ ~ ~  under 
the married women's acts,lg7 or of certain real property interests 
under marketable title statutes.lgs A drastic example would be the 
abolition of all property.lg9 
191. E.g., prohibitions on the activity of possession or on the institution of lawsuits. See strpra 
note 178. 
192. See supra text accompanying notes 53-54 where the cause of action is described as the 
cornerstone of a right. 
193. Enactment of guest statutes, Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117 (1929), or workmen's compen- 
sation, New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917). See also Duke Power Co. v. 
Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978), which denied compensation for a new 
law which limits liability for nuclear accidents, though the rationale was that the affected 
landowners would still have an action against the federal government, under the Tucker Act, in 
the event of a nuclear disaster. Id. at 94 11.39. 
194. Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 
(1978) (invalidating due-on-sale covenants in mortgages). 
195. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS L. 5 80-a (McKinney 1976). 
196. Seisin jure uxoris is the husband's common law right to possess freehold lands belonging 
to his wife. 
197. See, e .g . ,  N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. L. 8 .3-301 (McKinney 1978). In Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 447 
U.S. 903 (1981), the Supreme Court held that such a taking of rights was not only permitted but 
mandated by the fourteenth amendment. Specifically, the Court invalidated the former Louisi- 
ana Civil Code provision that the husband, as "head and master," had the power, acting alone, 
to dispose of community property. This equal protection holding was reached without discussing 
whether the attendant reallocation of rights disrupting the "bedrock of Louisiana's community 
property system," effected any takings, compensable or not. 447 U.S. at 432. Since the ruling 
was not retroactive, the failure to discuss the taking issue cannot be dismissed on glib grounds 
such as that the Court only "declared" what had, under the equal protection clause, been the 
law since 1868. Either way, the new holding would involve a taking of property without 
compensation, though the losers may not be husbands, but wives whose husbands' transactions 
were not retroactively affected. 
As precedent for Kirchberg v. Feenstra, one may cite Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), 
which similarly involved an apparent collision of constitutional principles. 
198. E . g . ,  FLA. STAT. ANN. 5 689.18 (1969); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30, 5 37e (1969); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. chs. 381.219, 381.221 (Baldwin 1979); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 184, $ 3 (West 1970); 
NEII. REV. STAT. $5 76-101, 76-102 (1976); N.Y. REAL PROP. Ams. LAW 8 1951 (McKinney 
1979); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW $ 345 (McKinney 1968). State courts have both upheld and 
invalidated such statutes. E.g.,  Trustees v. Batdorf, 6 Ill. 2d 486, 130 N.E.2d 111 (1955) 
(upheld); Cline v. Board of Educ., 548 S.W.2d 507 (Ky. 1977) (upheld); Hiddleston v. Nebraska 
Jewish Educ. Soc'y, 186 Neb. 786 (1971) (upheld). But cf. Biltmore Village v. Royal, 71 So. 2d 
727 (Fla. 1954) (cancellation of reverter provision a violation of contracts clause); Board of 
Edrlc. v. Miles, 15 N.Y.2d 364, 207 N.E.2d 181 (1965) (unconstitutional as applied retroactively 
to existing interests). See Aigler, Constitutionality of Marketable Title Acts, 50 MICH. L. REV. 
185 (1951); Note, Retroactive Termination of Burdens on Land Use, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1272 
(1965); Annot., 87 A.L.R.3d 1011 (1978). 
199. A limited version of an abolition of property-in favor of enhancing personal free- 
doms-is found in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1976). Under it, 
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I t  appears to be a fair assumption that, within the police power to 
regulate, there is included a power to deregulate on which the only 
general limitations are those of substantive due process and equal 
protection.200 Indeed, it has been held that the government must be 
able to take rights without compensation by modifying its regulatory 
pattern.201 We thus reach the somewhat ironic conclusion that po- 
lice-power deregulation, not regulation, is the governmental act 
which has the potential for uncompensated takings of rights in private 
property. The question is how to distinguish non-compensable in- 
stances of deregulatory right-taking from compensable takings of 
rights within the rightlfreedom analysis.202 
The answer to this question is suggested by a distinction made in the 
text of the Constitution itself. To recite, in pertinent part: 
nor shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.203 
The first part of this text implies that, subject to due process limita- 
tions, the government is free to take property, liberty, or even life 
innkeepers lost some of their right of exclusivity, enforceable by trespass actions, and others 
gained freedoms when the government deregulated access to places of public accommodation. 
The rights-deprivation involved was not a compensable taking. Heart of Atlanta Motel \ I .  United 
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). Note that, under the Act, the deregulation was accompanied by a 
new regulation limiting the innkeepers' freedom to exclude as well. This new freedom restriction 
would also, of course, not be in se compensable. 
A similar limited abolition of property rights in favor of personal freedoms was upheld in 
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). There, owners of a private shopping 
center were deprived by the state of their right of exclusivity as against those who \vished to 
exercise freedoms of speech and petition on the owners' land. The case is discussed further ir~fra 
note 220. See also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV, 53 N.Y.2d 124, 423 N.E.2d 320, 
440 N.Y.S.2d 843 (1981) (upheld statute which authorizes compulsory easements for CATV 
conduits over landlords' property). 
200. See Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 282 (1980) ("the State's interest in fashioning 
its own rules of tort law is paramount to any discernible federal interest, exccpt perhaps an 
interest in protecting the individual citizens from state action that is wholly arbitrary or irra- 
tional"); see also cases cited in preceding footnote; PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 
U.S. 74, 92-95 (1980) (Marshall, J .  concurring); Annot., 65 L. Ed. 2d 1219, 1230-31 (1981). 
Miscellaneous constitutional limitations such as the commerce and establishment clauses, are 
disregarded as having no special significance to the discussion. 
201. E . g . ,  Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 282 (1980); Demorest v. City Rank Farmer's 
Trust Co., 321 U.S. 36, 48 (1944) ("The whole cluster of vexatious problems arising from uses 
and trusts, mortmain, the rule against perpetuities, and testamentary directions for accumula- 
tions or for suspensions of the power of alienation, is one whose history admonishes against 
unnecessary rigidity."); see also PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 93 (1980) 
(Marshall, J. concurring) ("[if] common law rights were . . . immune from revision . . . [it] 
would freeze the common law as it has been constructed by the courts, perhaps at its 19th-cen- 
tury state of development"); Great N. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932); Tidal 
Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444 (1924); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877). 
202. Remember that the elimination of causes of action and, hence, rights is exactly what the 
government does when it engages in the typical trespassory and non-trespassory exercises of 
eminent domain. See supra text accompanying notes 85-114. 
203. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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itself. When property is taken for public use, however, the remainder 
of the text imposes the familiar just-compensation requirement. In 
contradistinction, no requirement of compensation appears for depri- 
vations of life or liberty,z04 nor for deprivations of property for other 
than public use.z05 Hence, it may be argued, in terms of the right1 
freedom dichotomy, that deregulatory takings of rightszoe are not 
compensable because such takings are not for public use. It is the 
public use proviso which excludes deregulatory takings from the just- 
compensation clause. 
In theory, substantive due process standards require that all govern- 
ment regulations have a public purpose, however loosely those stand- 
ards are applied.z07 The presence of a validating public purpose for a 
rights deprivation does not, however, necessarily mean that the rights 
are taken for public use. Hence, the question arises: Can rights-taking 
legislation have a validating public purpose and still not require com- 
pensation for the rights taken, on the grounds that the taking is not for 
public use? Or, reducing the problem to its essence, there is a question 
of whether the expression "public use" in the just-compensation clause 
and the public purpose requirement of substantive due process refer to 
two different ideasS2O8 
204. The fact that there is no just-compensation requirement for takings of liberty buttresses 
the argument that courts properly compensate only takings of rights, as defined herein, and not 
regulatory deprivations of freedoms. The use of the words liberty and property in the same 
phrase of the Constitution is evidence that the framers thought the two words referred to 
different ideas and intended them to be treated differently. In the alternative it could be argued, 
however, that property-related freedoms, such as use and enjoyment, are encompassed in the 
concept called property, and that the word liberty refers to freedoms which are and those which 
are not related to property. At any rate, the question is entirely one of interpretation. Though 
the gloss of the just-compensation clause cases in fact seems to support the first interpretation 
above (liberty and property are different), it must be admitted that the constitutional text only 
permits and does not compel this result. 
205. The application of the federal just-compensation requirement to the states is by the 
fourteenth amendment due process clause, see supra note 1, and that clause does not make the 
textual distinction under discussion, nor for that matter does it make any reference at all to 
takings for public use. The public use proviso was, however, expressly referred to in the case 
which extended the federal just-compensation requirement to the states. Chicago, B. & Q. R. 
Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236 (1897) (the state "legislature may prescribe a form of 
procedure to be observed in the taking of private property for public use, but it is not due process 
of law if provision be not made for compensation"). It seems fair to say that the fourteenth 
amendment requirement of just-compensation applies the terms of the fifth amendment clause to 
the states. 
206. Except, perhaps, "deregulation" eliminating rights against the government, i.e., re- 
moval by the government of freedom restrictions which the government previously committed 
itself to observe. Compare supra note 54 with infra text accompanying notes 223-34; 
207. See supra text accompanying notes 128-38. 
208. In the discussion that follows the expression public use has been reserved for references to 
the just-compensation clause proviso and the expression public purpose for references to the 
substantive due process standard. This does not imply that there is any particular authority for 
such a usage differentiation or that there is any particular legal significance to the somewhat 
different meanings which the two expressions may have in ordinary understanding. 
The argument posited in the text is that there are two different conceptions to refer to, and 
that the difference between the two has legal significance. This argument must stand or fall on 
its supporting analysis, not nomenclature. 
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The notion that public use refers to the same thing as the substan- 
tive due process public purpose requirement finds arguable support in 
Be~man v .  Pa~ker .~O~ The Court held in Berman that the government 
could constitutionally condemn private property for retransfer to pri- 
vate developers. The rationale was that such condemnations were for 
public use because they occurred in the pursuit of a legislatively 
determined public purpose. Thus, the meaning of public use was in 
effect identified with the scope of the police power.210 
At the same time, however, there have been indications that the 
question of whether a taking is for public use, requiring compensa- 
tion, is quite separate from the question of whether there are possible 
validating public purposes for the government's p r ~ g r a m . ~ "  The 
distinction appears clearly in Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies v .  Beck- 
In Webb's, the Court held that a state statute authorizing 
state courts to retain interest earned on money deposited with them 
was a taking of property without compensation in violation of the 
just-compensation clause.213 The Court stated that retention of the 
interest under the statute "has not merely 'adjusted the benefits and 
burdens of economic life to promote the common good'. . . . Rather, 
209. 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
210. Id. at 32-33. In the opinion, Justice Douglas provided a fairly detailed exegesis on the 
extent of the police power, with the apparent aim of supporting the conclusion that the takings 
involved were for public use. Thus, the inference arises that public use means "use for a public 
purpose, whether the actual user happens to be governmental or private." Id. at 33-34. How- 
ever, Douglas' reasoning does not compel the conclusion that taking for a public purpose 
necessarily means taking for a public use. My conclusion is that it does not. 
211. For example, in Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290 (1967), the Supreme Court 
overturned a state court decision which had established the seaward boundaries of littoral lands 
further inland than where they had previously been understood to be. Since, under local law, 
lands seaward of the boundaries belonged to the state, the redefinition of the boundary location 
arguably effected a wholesale uncompensated expropriation, in favor of the state, of private 
shoreline property. Though the holding was on non-constitutional grounds, Justice Stewart 
remarked in a concurring opinion: "[A] State cannot be permitted to defeat the constitutional 
prohibition against taking property without due process of law by the simple device of asserting 
retroactively that the property it has taken never existed at all." Id, at 296-97. The defeat 
presumably referred to by Stewart was that the state would, by its own redefinition, acquire 
land for itself without any payment. Stewart's remarks were approved by the Court in Bonelli 
Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 325 (1973). rehearing denied, 434 U.S. 1090 (1978), 
overruled on other grounds, Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd, v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 
U.S. 363 (1977). 
Earlier, in United States v. Caltex, 344 U.S. 149 (1952), the Court held that the destruction of 
terminal facilities by the United States Army to prevent their falling into enemy hands was not 
compensable because, inter alia, such destruction was not an appropriation for subsequent use. 
The implication was thus that there may be a public purpose for a taking without a public 
use-though the further implication that public use refers to only subsequent public use is 
questionable. Overall, the more satisfying rationale of the case is something on the order of a 
proximate cause-cum-emergency doctrine: "[Iln wartime many losses must be attributed solely 
to the fortunes of war, and not to the sovereign." Id. at 155. 
212. 449 U.S. 155 (1980). 
213. As earlier observed, the Court did not merely hold that property was taken, but it 
decided, contrary to the state's definition, what the term private property meant for purposes of 
the case. See supra note 23. 
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the exaction is a forced contribution to general governmental reve- 
nues.. . . "214 The taking in Webb's clearly was for public use, in- 
deed, the public use objective of the taking was the rationale of the 
case: 
T h e  county's appropriation of the beneficial use of the  fund  is analogous t o  
t he  appropriation of the use of private property in United States o. Causby 
. . . [where  t he  government acquired a n  affirmative easement by over- 
flights]. . . . "Causby emphasized tha t  Government  had  not  'merely de- 
stroyed property [bu t  was] using a pa r t  of it. . . .' " [However,  such 
"arbitrary use of governmental power" to effect acquisitions is the] very 
kind of thing tha t  t he  Taking Clause of the  Fifth Amendment  was  meant  
to  
Hence, it appears clear that a taking may be for public use without 
there being a justifying public purpose for the taking albeit there is a 
public purpose for the use. The two concepts are different. 
In light of the numerous circumstances where states have constitu- 
tionally modified private rights among private persons,216 a line must 
exist between such non-compensable takings and the compensable 
takings under the fifth amendment. The criterion of public use in the 
just-compensation clause would provide such a line. The distinction 
would be essentially between acquisitions of rights by the government 
in its corporate capacity2" and modifications of the rights enjoyed by 
private persons inter sese, subjecting the latter only to the very broad 
limitations of substantive due process and equal p r o t e ~ t i o n . ~ ' ~  Never- 
theless, the line is one which is difficult to state. A fair approximation 
might be as follows: when the government in its corporate capacity 
acquires or exercises dispositive control over property, for retransfer in 
some public program or otherwise,219 compensation is required for 
any rights taken. Conversely, when the government redistributes 
rights among private persons albeit for a public purpose, such govern- 
ment acts like many others, such as taking freedoms, levying taxes, or 
exacting fines and forfeitures, would be outside the ambit of the 
214. 449 U.S. at 163. 
215. 449 U.S. at 163-64 (emphasis supplied and citations omitted). The import of the takings 
cases generally is that the mere presence of a public purpose does not justify an uncompensated 
taking for public use. E . g . ,  Rerman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 36 (1954) ("The rights of these 
property owners are satisfied when they receive that just compensation which the Fifth A.nend- 
ment exacts as the price of the taking.") 
216. See supra notes 193-201. 
217. Sax uses the term "enterprise capacity" in describing acts of the government which ought 
to be compensable. See Sax, supra note 10, at 151. The concept of corporate capazity here is 
broader, referring generally to the legal personality of the government and, in particular, to its 
capacity as an entity to institute legal actions and, hence, to have rights. See supra text 
accompanying notes 52-59. The government typically would hold negative easements created by 
regulation in its corporate capacity, but not in Sax's "enterprise capacity." 
218. See supra note 200. 
219. It is clear that the public use proviso of the just-compensation clause does not require 
that the government retain the property which it acquires, nor that it use the property itself or 
directly. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
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just-compensation clause.220 In the case of such intra-private sector 
redistributions, the just-compensation clause does not apply since the 
clause expressly limits its reach to takings of property for public use.221 
VII. COMPENSABLE FREEDOM I PAIRMENT: 
APPURTENANT NEGATIVE ASEMENTS BY REGULATION 
Finally, the clarification provided by the rightslfreedoms dichot- 
omy may help to resolve the apparent inconsistency which troubled 
Professor Stoebuck's transfer-oriented test of takings.222 His test, con- 
sistently applied, would find a taking in transfers to the government 
of negative easements appurtenant to benefited government land, but 
would find no taking in transfers to the government of negative 
easements in gross.223 In both instances, negative easements may be 
created by regulation; both amount to transfers to the government, as 
220. In this regard, it may be observed that the "too far" principle of Pennsylvania Coal Co. 
v. Mahon, see supra text accompanying notes 139-45, has no apparent application to deregula- 
tory takings of rights. Indeed, to serve the public purpose of such legislation it is often deemed 
necessary to eliminate property rights entirely, e.g., in the case of marketable title statutes. See 
supra note 198. But cf. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S.  74 (1980). In Prtrne- 
Yard, the Supreme Court used a Mahon-type rationale in upholding a state reyuircment that 
shopping center owners permit free expression and pctitioning on their premises. The Court 
supported its holding with the observation that the owners had "failed to demonstrate that the 
'right to exclude others' is so essential to the use or economic value of their property that the 
state-authorized limitations of it amounted to a 'taking.' " Id. at 84. 
It seems clearly established, however, that in a proper case the government could withdraw a 
property right, constitutionally and without compensation, even though such \vithdra\rral of the 
right had the effect of totally destroying "the use or economic value of the property." See cases 
cited supra notes 186, 193-94, 197-201. Thus the Mahor~ test cannot consistently account for the 
general run of right-depriving cases like PrtrneYard. It is only by coincidence that the facts in 
PruneYard happened to satisfy the Mahon "too far" test. Therefore, it is submitted, PrurleYard 
can be better understood as a case where no compensation was required because the state did 
not, in its corporate capacity, acquire any rights for public use. 
221. Cf. United States v. Caltex, 344 U.S. 149 (1952) discussed slrpra note 211. 
It might be observed that it is not politically necessary for the just-compensation clause to 
apply to deregulatory takings of rights because, absent a governmental "appropriation of the 
beneficial use," there is less incentive for or likelihood of "the arbitrary use of governmental 
power" which "the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment was meant to prevent." Webb's 
Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. at 164 quoted .strpra text accompanying notes 
214-15. By contrast, the obvious potential public and political benefits of land-use restrictions 
offer a much greater incentive to impose restrictions which affect a few drastically, and most 
people favorably or not at all. Hence, a policy reason appears for the rule of Penrlsylvania Coal 
Co.  v .  Mahon in relation to use regulation situations that is less applicable where that rule does 
not apply. By the same token, in cases where the government takes for public use as in the 
Webb's case, supra text accompanying notes 212-16, it is arguable that the public purpose could 
never justify such a taking without compensation, no matter how little the interference with 
rights or freedoms. See supra note 215 and infra text accompanying notes 223-34. For cases 
where the government merely redistributes rights for other than public use but with a drastic 
effect on a few (e.g., requisitions my vintage Rolls-Royce to give it to the councilman's daugh- 
ter), the limitations of reasonable relationship and equal protection and on the taxing power, 
such as they are, would seem to provide any necessary protection. See supra note 155. 
222. See supra text accompanying notes 25-41. 
223. Id. 
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Stoebuck seems to use that word; and both are for public use. The 
transfer-oriented test does not, however, satisfactorily differentiate 
between them.224 Specifically, Stoebuck's theory does not explain 
why a transfer which is "specially directed toward benefiting a gov- 
ernmental entity" in land use, should be compensable while negative 
easement takings for other public purposes concededly should not. 
The rightslfreedoms analysis suggests an answer. When a govern- 
ment regulation restricts a private owner in the use of his land for the 
special benefit of nearby government land, the result, even though it 
takes only freedoms, is too similar to a compulsory version of a private 
transfer of rights.225 If the government uses or abuses its regulatory 
power to acquire rights as a landowner for public use at the direct, 
selective, and adventitious expense of a private owner who "happens 
to lie in the path of the project,"22e this would be exactly the kind of 
occurrence for which the policy of the just-compensation clause would 
require c~mpensat ion.~~'  In contrast, when the government enacts a 
regulation which imposes land-use restrictions in gross, the resulting 
freedom impairments do not comparably enhance, at private prop- 
erty's expense, the government's position of ownership as a taker for 
public use. True, the validity of such regulations is theoretically sub- 
ject to a substantive due process requirement of public purpose;228 
but, where no government land benefits, such freedom restrictions 
lack the intimate connection with the acquisition or exercise of rights 
to property, in a corporate capacity, that seems to be contemplated by 
the just-compensation requirement.229 
In this connection, the rightlfreedom analysis also avoids another 
analytical oddity of the transfer-oriented test of takings. When ap- 
plied evenly to negative easements appurtenant and negative ease- 
ments in gross, the transfer test makes regulatory transfers of ease- 
ments in gross to the government the exceptional case. By corollary, 
the whole police power to regulate land use becomes an exception to 
the just-compensation clause. In contrast, the rightlfreedom analysis 
regards the police power as occupying an essentially different domain 
224. Id.; see also Stoebuck, supra note 19, at 1091-93. 
225. See quoted language from Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies v .  Beckwith at supra text 
accompanying notes 214-15. 
226. United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945). 
227. Seesupra note 226; cf. Vernon Park Realty v. City of Mount Vernon, 307 N.Y. 493, 121 
N.E.2d 517 (1959) (ordinance limiting use of a lot to off-street parking purposes only, held 
invalid; ordinance benefited the government's neighboring streets by reducing congestion on the 
street); see also Sneed v. County of Riverside, 218 Cal. App. 2d 205, 32 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1963) 
(building height restrictions in the vicinity of an airport are really takings of aviation easements) 
and other cases cited at Van Alstyne, supra note 8, at 25-26 n.120. 
228. See supra text accompanying notes 127-30, 207. 
229. See supra text accompanying notes 219-21. 
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from the just-compensation clause.230 The police power is concerned 
with restrictions on freedoms whereas the just-compensation clause 
focuses upon the taking of rights. Thus, under the rightlfreedom 
analysis, it is the compensation requirement for takings of appurte- 
nant negative easements which is an exception to the general rule, 
viz., that only takings of rights are compensable. The too-much-like- 
a-taking policy explanation offered above for the exception is not 
wholly satisfying, though neither perhaps, at the fringes, is the policy 
rationale suggested earlierz3' for the rightslfreedom dichotomy which 
the holdings in fact create. At any rate, it may be argued that the 
exceptional compensability of appurtenant negative easements should 
not exist at all. The government, as a landowner, ought to be as 
eligible as anyone else to enjoy the benefits of zoning and environmen- 
tal regulations.z32 Only the fear of abuse of power would seem to 
suggest a presumption against such eligibility.z33 
VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The law of eminent domain does not provide even remotely consist- 
ent protection for private economic interests, but neither is it an 
erratic accretion of irreconcilables. Rather, it appears that the law's 
underpinning is a set of principles which are both coherent and rela- 
tively defensible from a policy standpoint. While judicial opinions 
have not comprehensively articulated these principles, and especially 
their interplay, aspects of their application are repeatedly men- 
t i ~ n e d ~ ~ ~  and their force is almost uniformly felt in the courts' hold- 
ings. z35 
The central principle which appears to control the cases of alleged 
police-power takings is that, in general, compensation is not constitu- 
tionally required for regulations of land use that merely impair free- 
doms to use and enjoy. Instead the just-compensation clause appears 
to be primarily concerned with governmental acts which take or 
impair owners' legally enforceable rights of property. The concepts 
referred to by the words right and freedom in this context have been 
stipulatively defined to reflect and illuminate a distinction which is in 
fact made by the cases. As so defined, right and freedom together 
230. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887) ("[Tlhe present case must be governed by 
principles that do not involve the power of eminent domain. . . ."). 
231. See supra text accompanying notes 178-84. 
232. See supra text accompanying note 41. 
233. See supra notes 41 and 227. 
234. See, e.g. ,  quotations supra note 123, and supra notes 126, 140, 214-15 and accompany- 
ing text. 
235. This uniformity is particularly evident in holdings of the United States Supreme Court, 
though some deviation is found in some state court cases, especially those influenced by the now 
obsolete physical intrusion criterion of taking. See supra notes 15, 109, 112 and 114. 
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seem to cover a major portion of what is generally understood as 
property interests. Distinguishing between them provides a basis for 
explaining (but not necessarily justifying) almost all of the cases of 
alleged police-power takings and for unifying such cases with the law 
of eminent domain. 
There are three secondary principles which also affect the outcomes 
of alleged police-power takings cases. First, an impairment of free- 
doms may so far restrict the use and enjoyment of a parcel of land as 
to render the owner's legally enforceable rights nugatory. Such under- 
mining of the purpose for which the rights are sought and conferred 
would amount to the functional equivalent of a taking and is treated 
as such. Second, an impairment of freedom may be constitutionally 
invalid apart from any just-compensation clause considerations, most 
prominently by failing to meet the substantive due process require- 
ment of a reasonable relationship to some justifying public purpose. 
Freedom regulations of this sort are struck down but not compensated 
as takings. Third, a governmental redistribution of rights among pri- 
vate persons, through modifying the available set of potential causes 
of action, would fall outside the just-compensation clause because 
such takings are not for public use, albeit they are for some justifying 
public purpose. Such takings are neither invalid nor compensable. 
To be sure, the basis suggested in this Article for understanding the 
law of eminent domain is highly conceptual or formalistic. The anal- 
ysis presented would at least, however, supply an observed and settled 
distinction as the basis for future determinations of "justice and fair- 
n e ~ s . " ~ ~ ~  This may not be the ultimate way to wage the "battle of 
conflicting interests,"237 but for courts of law it is at least a legal way 
to do so. This, in itself, makes it preferable to reliance on an array of 
fuzzy philosophisms that offer neither clear cut specific guidance nor 
any assured criterion of what, as a general matter, is just. 
236. See supra note 44. 
237. Sax, supra note 8, at 41. 
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